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To regard people as equals is to take a stand on how they are to be 
treated, not to make a remark about their capacities. It is to recog­
nize that they have something about them which justifies their be
ing accorded the same status as others irrespective of their ability 
to achieve that status for themselves. 
-John Harris 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Children's rights advocates and scholars alike continue to call for the 
development of innovative and alternative rights models, which specifically 
provide for an expansive conceptualization of children's rights.2 Central to 
their calls for reform is a simultaneous recognition that children's rights must 
embody agency-a child's voice (a proxy for autonomy)-free from govern­
mental interference, as well as the establishment of certain fundamental 
"needs" that the State has an affirmative obligation to ensure the child has, 
and when necessary, affirmatively provide. Informed by medicine, develop­
mental psychology, social work, and neuroscience,3 such needs are com­
1 John Harris, The Political Status ofChildren, in CONTEMPORARY PouTJCAL PHILOSOPHY: 
RADICAL STUDIES 35, 50 (Keith Graham ed., 1982). 
2 See generally Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to 
Children'sRights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Anne C. Dailey, Children'sConstitutional 
Rights, 95 MINN. L. REv. 2099, 2169 (2011) (arguing for a developmental theory of children's 
constitutional rights); TAu GAL, CHILD V1cnMs AND RESTORATIVE JusTICE: A NEEDS-RIGHTS 
Mona (2011) (advocating a needs-rights model as a restorative justice tool for children vic­
tims crime); Ruth Zafran, Children's Rights as Relational Rights: The Case of Relocation, 18 
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. Po1:v & L. 163 (2010). 
3 See, e.g., Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, Before It's Too Late: Neuropsychologi
cal Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. 
MICH. J.L. REr-oRM 561, 561-65 (2000) (detailing the failure of child welfare law and prac­
tices to incorporate the current knowledge on brain development for children, particularly from 
55 Spring 2015 Rights for Immigrant Children 
prised of the basic provisions including, but not limited to, education, food, 
shelter, and responsible caregiver(s).4 These children's interest-based rights 
models5 critique the earlier theories concerning the treatment of children, 
including: the paternalistic notions of parens patriae, from which the best 
interest of the child standard in the United States evolved; traditional rights 
theory (choice theory, liberal theory), in which children are devoid of rights 
and agency because they lack autonomy;6 and the children liberationists, 
who simply argue that children should be treated as miniature adults,7 while 
ignoring the significant differences cognitively, physically, and emotionally, 
which exist between children and adults. 
Re-imagining children's rights also requires reforming our laws in such 
a way that reflects children as inimitable rights holders8 who possess unique 
positive rights.9 Indeed, constitutional rights for children require "rejecting 
the prevailing view of affirmative constitutional rights as they pertain to 
children. A constitutional regime of negative liberty for adults does not pre­
clude the recognition of affirmative rights for children." 10 Advocates for the 
interest-based-also referred to as a needs-based-rights theory have called 
for its implementation and incorporation into contested custody disputes, 11 
a neuroscience perspective and arguing that interventions for neglected children focus on pro­
viding developmentally appropriate educational, rehabilitative, and protective services for chil­
dren, and must be a mandatory component of child welfare practice). 
4 Id. at 599-611; GAL, supra note 2, at 30 (summarizing Ochafta and Esponsa's argument 
that children's needs and their satisfiers differ in accordance to the different states of a child's 
development). 
5 Jeremy Waldron, The Role ofRights in Practical Reasoning: "Rights" Versus "Needs," 4 
J. Ernics 115 (2000) (rejecting the notion that rights are usually negative claims on others­
claims to their forbearance-and arguing that rights can be understood perfectly well as a 
discourse in which affirmative claims are aniculated). 
6 David Archand, Free Speech and Children's Interests, 79 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 83, 91-93 
(2004) ("A child incapable of exercising choice is reasonably disqualified from having liberty 
rights."); see also GAL, supra note 2, at 23-28. 
7 See Dailey, supra note 2, at 2123. 
8 Martha Minow argues that autonomy is not a precondition for having rights. It is the 
relationship that creates the power differences between children and adults, and that can be 
changed. Minow, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
9 Joel Feinberg, A Postscript to the Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JusTICE, AND 
THE BOUNDS OF LmERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 156-57 (1980) (arguing that chil­
dren-only rights include positive rights such as education). 
'°Dailey, supra note 2, at 2169. "The developmental theory's core insight into the impor­
tance of caregiving to children's future autonomy suppons recognizing children's fundamental 
constitutional rights in the care giving relationship." Id. at 2104. 
11 See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Per­
spectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 18-21 (1994) (arguing for the importance of 
considering a child's voice and the imponance of incorporating children into the legal model of 
personhood in constitutional law, child suppon, and child custody determinations); see also 
Zafran, supra note 2, at 166-68 (arguing for an alternative "relational rights" approach that 
conceptualizes children as moral agents but also mutually dependent on the family relationship 
in the context of relocation decisions). 
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the juvenile justice framework, 12 and adoption and parental termination 
proceedings. 13 
Yet, children in U.S. immigration law are still most often seen as illegal 
migrants and "the law enforcement approach toward [these] migrants 
[is][to] prioritize[] their 'alien' status over their status as children." 14 With 
a few notable exceptions, immigration law has been stagnant to adopt dy­
namic models that incorporate rights models that are informed by the devel­
opmental needs of children. Indeed, "[d]ebates about the nature of 
children's rights have largely bypassed immigration law." 15 
This Article contributes to the much-needed discourse about how chil­
dren's rights should be understood and realized in immigration law. Specifi­
cally, the incorporation of a needs-based rights model, informed by 
international human rights law, would provide a scaffold through which to 
critically assess how the existing procedural framework and avenues for sub­
stantive immigration relief fail to protect children-as children. Ultimately, 
this Article recommends structural changes to the immigration system that 
acknowledge migrant children as independent rights holders-distinct from 
other adults-eligible to apply for immigration relief in their own right, 
while simultaneously recognizing the need to protect children with child­
centered procedures and expertise. 
Part I of the Article provides a history of the "child saving movement," 
which advocated for an active role of the State in protecting children from 
grave harms such as child abuse, neglect, and child labor. To this end, the 
State, as parens patriae, must be vigilant to determine what are the "best 
interests" of the child; yet, this determination is devoid of any consideration 
of the child's wants or desires. 
Part II summarizes and critiques both the traditional rights theory, 
which fails to recognize rights for children due to a belief that they are not 
autonomous, as well as the child liberationist theory, which is insensitive to 
child-centered needs that must be protected. Both of these models are inade­
quate because they fail to fully appreciate that the rights accorded to a child 
must integrate a child's complex developmental needs. 
Part III describes how human rights law situates rights as trans-sover­
eign. Humans do not possess rights simply because they are citizens of a 
state, nor do they possess them because they are rational agents bound by a 
12 Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of 
Children, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 70-80 (1998) (advancing alternative measures to the 
juvenile justice system that encompass prevention, rehabilitation, appropriate punishment as 
well as provide for the best interest of the child as a priority). 
13 See generally Matthew B. Johnson, Examining the Risks to Children in the Context of 
Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397, 417-24 
(1996) (documenting three parental tennination case studies to illustrate how a child's needs 
are assessed by the courts). 
14 LAUREN HEIDBRINK, MIGRANT Yot.JTH, TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES AND THE STATE: 
CARE AND CONTESTED INTERESTS 42 (2014). 
15 David Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights 
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 Omo ST. L.J. 979, 990 (2002). 
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social contract with a sovereign; the rights humans enjoy flow from their 
mere existence-rights are inherent to being human. Human rights law rec­
ognizes this position and accordingly extends rights to children. The wide 
acceptance of this needs-based rights model is perhaps best illustrated by the 
creation and rapid international acceptance of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), the first comprehensive and international framework for 
children's rights. This seminal human rights treaty locates the child as the 
principal agent, who as a rights holder is guaranteed not only protection 
from governmental interference, but also demands that children are be­
stowed explicit positive rights. 
Part IV explores the existing gaps in immigration law-substantively 
and procedurally-that serve as roadblocks to providing the necessary child­
centered approach, which includes the congressional and executive branch 
responses to the recent surge of unaccompanied minors who seek safe haven 
in the United States from violence in their homes across Central America. 
This crisis illuminates the fundamental structural gaps in our immigration 
system that prevent treating children as rights bearers in need of distinct 
safeguards. 
Part V concludes that, in order to adequately protect immigrant chil­
dren, our immigration system must adopt a needs-based rights model that 
conceptualizes children, separate and apart from adults, as unique rights 
holders with exceptional needs. Specifically, significant changes must be 
made to our immigration system, including the formation of a statutory fed­
eral "best interest of the child standard" that is informed by the CRC and 
unconditionally applied to children seeking immigration relief. Furthermore, 
the guiding principles of the CRC, which serve as a framework for a needs­
based rights model, must be operationalized through a congressionally cre­
ated interagency "Child Protection Corps" in all future U.S. government 
responses, approaches, guidelines, and forms of international relief and pro­
tection to immigrant children. 
I. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 

LAw AND ITs CR1T1cs 

This section of the Article examines the ancient conceptions of children 
as private property subject to the whims of their father, and also traces the 
historical evolution of realizing children as individuals that are inherently 
worthy in their own right and deserving of a basic level of protection. This 
realization permits the state to intervene and usurp parental prerogatives 
when necessary to protect a child from harm. This section also summarizes 
the emergence of the best interest of the child standard in Anglo-American 
law and concludes with critiques of the standard as it applies in family law. 
58 Harvard Latino Law Review Vol. 18 
Until the nineteenth century, children were considered the property of 
their father, who was afforded near absolute rights over his children. 16 Under 
Athenian law, children could be sold into slavery or simply abandoned; there 
was simply no obligation, legal or otherwise, to either protect a child or 
provide for a child's unmet needs.'7 Likewise, under the Roman law "doc­
trine" of paterfamilias, children owed their father their labor and any in­
come they earned while living in his household. 18 Moreover, a father was 
free to discipline children as he saw fit, including the use of corporal 
punishment. 19 
Although during the early part of the medieval period there was a simi­
lar "absence of interest in children," parents appeared to develop a "new 
preoccupation with the experiences of childhood" and in nurturing their 
children into adulthood beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.20 
Throughout the Middle Ages, consistent with the feudalistic structure of au­
thority based on status and hierarchy, children were often relegated to "duty 
and obedience" under their parents' authority.21 Political and social reforms, 
which began in sixteenth-century England and continued into the American 
colonies, shifted the notion of authority from status to consent.22 However, 
despite even these reforms, children were still viewed as immature and be­
lieved to lack the necessary capabilities to intelligently consent.23 Therefore, 
at that time, "childhood became a distinct legal status because [they] were 
perceived as lacking the ability to form their own judgments."24 
This view of children prevailed into the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, where the Progressive Era Reformers spurred a "child saving" 
movement, which ultimately gave the government a "paternal presence in 
16 LeAnn Larson Lafave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best Interests of the Child" Stan­
dard, 34 S.D. L. REv. 459, 464-70 (1989) (providing an overview of the historical develop­
ment of children's rights). Professor Lafave describes how under the Roman Empire a "child 
was simply the property of the father; a Roman father could sell his own child into slavery or 
even put his child to death." Id. at 464-65. The English Common Law gave all powers to the 
father, and the mother, in contrast, "was entitled to no power [over her children], but to 
reverence and respect." Id. (citing l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453). 
17 Stephen R. Amott, Autonomy, Standing, and Children's Rights, 33 WM. MrrcHELL L. 
REv. 807, 809 (2007). Athenian children born out of wedlock were not even considered "citi­
zens." Id. 
18 Under the Roman law of paterfamilias, a man's wife and children were chattels belong­
ing to him, along with slaves and other personal property. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing 
Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. Ri:.v. 663, 664 ( 1923). A Roman father even had the legal 
right to kill his child. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, Tmrr, PROBLEMS 
491 (2d ed. 1991). 
19 See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 983, 986-87 (1996). 
20 Amott, supra note 17, at 811-12. 
21 See id. Amott further posits that this notion of a child's duty of obedience, without 
"corresponding rights," has persisted throughout history and into the American legal system. 
Id. He also notes that "notions of duty and obedience" did not distinguish between adults and 
children; the structure was based solely on status, which explains why some children in post­
Reformation England held such great power. Id. 
22 Id. at 812. 
23 Id. 
i• Id. 
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children's lives."25 Children, who were still considered incapable of making 
decisions for themselves, were seen as dependent upon adults.26 
Under this movement, acting in its capacity as parens patriae, the State 
necessarily interfered with the family structure and decisions when the par­
ents' actions threatened the child's well-being.27 "But state authority [did] 
not lead to children having rights of their own."28 Initiatives to protect chil­
dren included compulsory education and restrictions on child Iabor.29 Most 
notably, "[t]he juvenile court under challenge in In re Gault was itself a 
product of Progressive Era reforms."30 These reformers sought to protect 
children's innocence by shielding them from their own impressionability.31 
This movement was responsible for the invention of "adolescence," which 
resulted in the expansion of childhood.32 
It was during this time in Anglo-American family law that the "best 
interest of the child standard emerged as the prevailing substantive legal 
principle in determining the fate of children."33 Under this new standard 
state courts and quasi-judicial tribunals were ordered to employ the best in­
terest standard when making a placement decision for a child in adoption, 
fostering, guardianship, and even matrimonial proceedings. 34 In 1973, Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, in Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child,35 articulated a psychoanalytic theory to encompass "all legislative, 
judicial, and executive decisions generally or specifically concerned with 
establishing, administering, or re-arranging child-parent relationships."36 
They advocated for: 
three component guidelines for decision-makers concerned with 
determining the placement and the process of placement of a child 
in a family or alternative setting. These guidelines rest on the be­
lief that children whose placement becomes the subject of contro­
25 Martha Mi now, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 279 
(1995). 
26 See Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family: Ill. State Interests in 
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1198, 1201-02 (1980) (discussing the overarching principles 
and justification of the State's parens patriae powers). 
21 Id. 
28 Dailey, supra note 2, at 2112. 
29 Minow, supra note 25, at 280. 
Jo Id. at 279 (quoting In re Gault, 383 U.S. I (1967)) (footnote omitted). 
Jt See id. 
J2 Minow, supra note 2, at 9; see also VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: 
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 56-137 (1985) (noting that changes in societal 
attitudes about work and education contributed to the transformation in how a child's worth is 
conceptualized). 
JJ Thronson, supra note 15, at 984; see also Sara McGinnis, Comment, You Are Not the 
Father: How State Paternity Laws Protect (and Fail to Protect) the Best Interest of Children, 
16 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 311, 314 (2008) (noting that American courts have 
utilized the best interest of the child standard since 1815). 
J• Cl.AIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A WESTERN 
TRADinON IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 44-45 (2002). 
J5 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALIJERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD (1973). 
J6 Id. at 5. 
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versy should be provided with an opportunity to be placed with 
adults who are or are likely to become their psychological 
parents.37 
In making placement decisions an adjudicator must (1) "safeguard the 
child's need for continuity of relationships";38 (2) "reflect the child's, not the 
adult's, sense of time";39 and (3) "must take into account the law's incapacity 
to supervise interpersonal relationships and the limits of knowledge to make 
long-range predictions."40 Overall, these authors argued that "the law's pre­
sumption that the child's parents are best suited to represent and safeguard 
his interests should not prevail."41 
Currently, the fifty states42 and the District of Columbia43 have statutes 
that recognize that the best interests of the child must be a consideration in 
determining what services, actions, and orders will best serve a child, as well 
as who is best suited to take care of a child. While there is no singular 
definition of best interests of the child, some commonly accepted principles 
in assessing the best interests of a child have developed over time, including 
incorporating the child's voice, as well as prioritizing safety, permanency, 
and the well-being of every individual child.44 Yet, even today the substan­
tive differences among the states are striking. For example, as of 2012 
37 Id. at 31. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 40. 
40 Id. at 49. 
41 BREEN, supra note 34, at 50 n. I 08. 
42 ALA. CoDE § 12-15-101 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 47.05.065(3)-(4) and 
47.10.082 (West 2014); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 8-845(A)-(C) and 8-847(D) (2012); ARK. 
CoDE ANN.§ 9-27-102 (West 2014); CAL. FAM. CoDE § 175(a), (b) (West 2014); CAL. Wm.I'. 
& INST. CoDE § 16000 (West 2014); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-102(1), (1.5) (West 
2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 45a-719 (West 2014); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (West 
2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.810 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-310 (West 2014); 
HAw. REv. STAT. § 587A-2 (West 2014); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 16-1601 (West 2014); IND. 
CoDE ANN.§ 31-34-19-6 (West 2014); lowA CODE ANN.§§ 232B.2 and 232.104 (West 2014); 
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-220l(b) (West 2014); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 620.023 (West 2014); 
LA. CHILD. CoDE ANN. art. 601 and 675 (2014); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 4055(2) (2014); 
MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw §5-525(t) (West 2014); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §I (West 
2014); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260C.193(subdivision 3) (West 2014); Miss. CoDE. ANN.§ 43-21-103 (West 2014); MONT. 
CODE ANN.§ 41-3-101 (West 2014); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 43-533 (West 2014); NEv. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 128.005(2)(c) (West 2014); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 169-C:2 (West 2014); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 30:4C-I and 30:4C-1 l.l(a) (West 2014); N.M STAT. ANN.§§ 32A-4-28(A) and 
32A-l-3 (West 2014); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 358-a(3)(c) and 384-b(I) (McKinney 2014); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7B-507(d) and 7B-l00 (West 2014); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. 
§ 2151.414(0) (West 2014); OR. REv. STAL ANN. § I 07.137(1) (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 63-1-30 and 63-1-20(0) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-7A-56 (2014); TENN. CoDE 
ANN. §§ 36-1-101 and 36-1-113(i) (West 2014); TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 263.307 (West 
2013); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 78A-6-503(8), (12) (West 2014); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5114 
(West 2014); VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-124.3 (West 2014); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 13.34.020 
(West 2014); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 49-1-l(a)(l)-(8) (West 2014); Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 48.426(2)-(3) (West 2014); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-201 (West 2014). 
43 O.C. CODE§ 16-2353 (2014). 
44 See generally Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a "Best Interests ofthe Child" Approach 
into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HuM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 120, 127 (2009) (argu­
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twenty-one states and the District of Columbia enumerate specific criteria 
the courts should consider when making a best interest determination; 
whereas, the other twenty-nine states' statutes only provide general guidance 
and permit vastly more discretion to a court making the best interests deter­
minations.45 Moreover, several states and the District of Columbia expressly 
require courts to consider the child's wishes, taking into account the child's 
age and maturity to express a reasonable preference, when making this 
determination.46 
The overall lack of consistency, coupled with broad judicial discretion 
as evidenced by variance among the states, has resulted in resounding criti­
cisms from the courts47 and scholars48 alike that the best interest of the child 
standard "is a vague, subjective, and malleable principle."49 The strongest 
critics are troubled by the standard's apparent indeterminacy.50 Professor 
Robert Mnookin asserts that what is "best" or "least detrimental" for any 
individual child is both speculative and indeterminate; and even if this model 
could produce predictions, there is no societal consensus on what is "best" 
or "least detrimental."51 Instead of using a balancing test borne out of the 
best interest of the child standard,52 Mnookin argues that a more rule-like 
ing that the best interests of the child principle used in state child welfare proceedings should 
be applied to accompanied children in immigration proceedings). 
45 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHIU> 3-4 
(2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.cfm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MFW7-DG49?type=pdf. 
46 ld. at 5. 
47 See, e.g., Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("[O]ur research 
has failed to reveal a consistent, universally accepted approach to the question of when a 
custodial parent may relocate out-of-state over the objection of the non-custodial parent. In 
fact, the opposite is true. Across the country, applicable standards remain distressingly 
disparate."). 
48 See, e.g., Mary Becker, Judicial Discretion on Child Custody: The Wisdom of Solo­
mon'!, 81 Ju,. BJ. 650, 651 (1993) (illustrating the range of judicial interpretations of the best 
interest standard); McGinnis, supra note 33, at 313 (arguing that state laws do not act in the 
best interest of the child}. 
49 See Zafran, supra note 2, at 178 (citing Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, 
and Child Custody, I S. CAL. L. REV. & WoMEN's STUD. 133, 172 (1992} (describing the 
difficulties in determining and implementing what is in the best interest of the child)}. There is 
considerable literature on problems with applying the best interest standard in state custody 
disputes between parents. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 16, at 514-27 (arguing for substantive 
and procedural modifications to the best interest of the child standard to better define the 
standard for adjudicators and parties involved in custody disputes); Andrea Charlow,Awarding 
Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 267, 269 
(1987) (criticizing the best interest standard as a "euphemism for unbridled judicial discre­
tion"); PHYLLIS CHr;sLuR, MOTHERS ON ThlAL: THE BATl'LE roR CHILDREN AND CusTODY 66 
(1986) (finding in a study of sixty mothers who had been custodially challenged between 
1960-1981, that 70% of her sample, which she described as "good enough" mothers, lost 
custody; and 83% of the fathers had not been involved in the primary care of their children, 
62% of the fathers had physically abused their wives, and 37% of the fathers had kidnapped 
their children). 
50 Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
lndetermillllcy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975). 
51 fd. 
52 Id. at 262-68. 
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structure in making these types of determinations for children is preferable.53 
Expounding on Mnookin' s criticism of the best interest of the child standard, 
Jon Elster argues that, in addition to the standard being indeterminate and 
ignoring the rights of parents, it is also vulnerable to being subjugated to 
larger public policy considerations including preserving societal values re­
garding who is a legitimate parent. 54 
Consistent with these criticisms, in her recent article, Children's Rights 
as Relational Rights: A Case for Relocation, Professor Ruth Zafran advances 
an ontological critique of the best interest of the child standard for failing to 
incorporate a child's agency and status as a rights holder, and concludes that: 
[T]he principle of the best interests of the child suffers from being 
a paternalistic (or, more precisely, parentalistic) criterion, formu­
lated by the parent or by the state standing in the parent's shoes. In 
that sense, there is a substantive conceptual difference between the 
principle of the best interests of the child-which reflects the un­
derstanding of the "responsible adult" who determines for the 
child where her best interests lie-and a decision grounded in the 
rights of the child. The latter is supposed to reflect the will of the 
child herself (when it can be ascertained) and her rights, just like 
any decision reached with respect to any individual. In that sense, 
the deep (or "true") interest of the child is to be treated as a right­
bearer; adopting a best interest standard therefore is inconsistent 
with the child's fundamental interest.55 
Overall, the child saving movement challenged the earlier notions of 
families as purely private relationships that are immune from governmental 
interference. This movement reformed the law to provide additional legal 
grounds for state intervention into "domestic" affairs when the state deter­
mined such interference was in the best interest of the child. Yet, the best 
interests standard, entrenched in paternalistic notions of a child's need for 
state protection, in addition to assisting children, served as a cloak to ad­
vance the state's prerogatives and values, while at the same time trumping 
private morals, all in the name of protecting a child's best interests. 
53 Id. 
54 Elster cites the example of a lesbian mother losing custody of her child in Great Britain 
because of her sexual orientation to illustrate circumstances in which a court knowingly and 
deliberately refuses to apply the best interest of the child standard because other public policy 
considerations trump. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 
54 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 26 (1987). In summarizing the decision, Elster concludes that the argu­
ment of the court was essentially: "the risk of the children, at critical ages, being exposed or 
introduced to ways of life which, as this case illustrates, may lead to severance from normal 
society, to psychological stresses and unhappiness and possibly to physical experience which 
may scar them for life." Id. at 27. 
55 Zafran, supra note 2, at 179. 
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II. TRADITIONAL AND LIBERATIONIST RIGHTS MODELS 

AS APPLIED TO CHILDREN 

If the Anglo-American best interest of the child standard truly falls 
short for children, as Zafran claims, are rights theories the correct solution? 
This section of the Article explores how certain rights models have treated 
children throughout history. Specifically, this section provides an overview 
of both the traditional rights model and the liberationist rights model as ap­
plied to children. The aim of this section is to illustrate why traditional rights 
theories, which often implicate negative rights, are insufficient models for 
children because they ultimately depend on the mistaken assumption that 
autonomy is a precondition for rights.56 Moreover, this section also high­
lights the pitfalls of the child liberationist theory as an appropriate model for 
children due to the fact that it does not take into consideration the difference 
in the capacity a child has to advocate for his or her rights57 and what child­
specific needs or child rights exist.58 Consequently, both the traditional rights 
model and the child liberationist theory disappoint because they fail to pro­
vide a workable framework to protect children's basic needs without limiting 
their voice. However, while this section concludes that a rights discourse can 
be limiting, there is no doubt that it can be instrumental both politically in 
changing realities,59 as well as in promoting a non-paternalistic, child-cen­
tered framework that structurally empowers children.60 
A. Traditional Rights Models Exclude Children as Right-Holders 
The traditional rights model is anchored in contemporary liberalism in­
formed by the works of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke, 
whose writings embodied a modern individualist outlook.61 Reacting to the 
tyrannical and arbitrary use of state power against the individual that was 
often manifested by religious and political intolerance and persecution, these 
political philosophers "sought to articulate a framework for a society in 
which all citizens could be free from the fear, injustice, suffering and socio­
political turmoil produced by capricious judgments and punishments justi­
56 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERI­
CAN LAW 301 (1990). 
57 Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process 
Rights ofChildren, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 408 (1996) ("Children, as nonvoting actors 
in society, cannot advocate for their own rights. Instead their rights are determined by 
others."). 
58 Waldron, supra note 5, at 122-25 (discussing how a needs-based rights model might be 
conceptualized). 
59 MrNow, supra note 56, at 307. 
60 
"The language of rights helps people to articulate standards for judging conduct without 
pretending to have found the ultimate and unalterable truth ... children no less than adults can 
participate in the legal conversation that uses rights to gain the community's attention." Id. at 
308. 
61 See SHAUN P. YOUNG, BEYOND RAWI-'>: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL 
LmERALISM 26 (2002). 
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fied and enforced via the whimsical use of state power-they sought to 
provide the foundation for a stable and just society."62 While there are varia­
tions of liberalism,63 the values and beliefs most commonly associated with 
this political philosophy include: the importance of the individual; the belief 
in individual equality and individual rights; the right to be free from govern­
ment intrusion through a limited constitutional government; the importance 
of private property; and lastly, autonomy.64 Building upon the work of class­
ical liberalists, which was largely centered on the relationship between pro­
tection and self-preservation, John Stuart Mill transformed the focus into 
modern liberalism's struggle for "the fundamental connection between pro­
tecting individual liberty and property and securing the conditions under 
which all individuals might be able to realize their full potential ...."65 
Following from Locke's view, the "traditional rights model" premise is that 
individuals are rational and autonomous by nature and that the ultimate func­
tion of law is to accord an individual's dignity.66 Therefore, the government 
should respect individual choice, because as a rational agent, a person can 
choose his or her own conception of the good67 as it relates to morality, 
religion, occupation, or life's purposes.68 
Critical to both modern liberal theory and the traditional rights model is 
the notion of consent. Individuals are capable of making rational choices 
about morality, religion, and occupation. This autonomy in decision making 
is the predicate to both possessing and protecting the fundamental rights of a 
free society, including the right to vote, as well as freedom of speech, associ­
ation and religion, and personal liberty.69 Undeniably, the primary purpose 
of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights is to shield individuals from govern­
mental interference and provide equal liberty for autonomous choice.70 As 
62 Id. at 26. 
63 JoHN GRAY, LmERALISM xi (2d ed. 1995) ("[W]hereas liberalism has no single, un­
changing nature or essence, it has a set of distinctive features which exhibits its modernity and 
at the same time marks it off from other modem intellectual traditions and their associated 
political movements."). 
64 YouNG, supra note 61, at 26. 
65 Id. at 28. 
66 John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness argues that the following "principles of jus­
tice" will emerge: "a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. b. Social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society." JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER­
ALISM 291 (1993). 
67 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971). 
68 Id. at 1987-98. 
69 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876 n.2 ("Au­
tonomy has been identified as a value underlying the constitutional protection of privacy, pro­
cedural due process, equal protection, and free exercise rights."). 
70 RAwL.S, supra note 67, at 28. 
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such, the traditional rights model only recognizes negative rights-specifi­
cally, freedom from intrusion.71 
Nonetheless, the liberal model acknowledges exceptions to personal au­
tonomy, most notably, where the State must interfere with one person's 
choices in order to protect the liberties and autonomy of another individual.72 
Moreover, liberal scholars also recognize that certain individuals have innate 
qualities that may justify affirmative state action as an exception to the pre­
sumption of freedom of choice with no government interference.73 For exam­
ple, in the traditional rights/choice theory model, children cannot be rights 
holders because they are not autonomous; rather, as Mill explains, they need 
the protection of the State: 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to 
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculty. We are 
not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which 
the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are 
still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be 
protected against their own actions as well as against external 
injury.74 
Under the principles of both liberal and traditional rights models, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been unwilling to permit state intervention against 
another individual to protect a child-regardless of incongruous results­
because children are devoid of rights, therefore rendering them incompetent 
and unable to make rational decisions. 75 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department ofSocial Services,76 the Court held that the state had no affirma­
tive obligation to interfere with a parent's right to choose how to raise a 
child, even where a father violently beat his four-year-old son into a coma, 
which resulted in permanent brain damage. It is only when the U.S. Supreme 
71 See Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. Rrs. & DEV. 
L.J. I, 4-5 (2004) (discussing the "classical Western notion" of negative rights, specifically its 
focus 	on choice and autonomy). 
72 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1978). 
73 Id. 
74 JoHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY WITH THE SusmcnoN OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON 
Soc1ALISM 13 (Stephan Collini ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 1989) 
(1859). 
75 Dailey' supra note 2, at 2109-11; see also DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND 
CHILDHOOD 54 (2004) ("If, as many will argue, children are incapable of exercising choice, 
then according to the will theory at least, they do not have rights."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (noting that parents possess broad constitutional right about the 
care and custody of their children because children are not yet "fully rational, choosing 
agent[s]"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests 
on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity 
for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions."). 
76 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that 
the state child services agency had no duty to rescue the child from his abuser); see also 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (holding that state aid to impoverished children, in­
cluding providing the requisite nutrition for bare survival, is a mere legislative prerogative and 
not a constitutional right). 
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Court sees children as miniature adults, which are suddenly capable of ra­
tional decision making, that it seemingly locates independent rights of a 
child.77 
For example, in In re Gault the Court held that when a child is to be 
sentenced like an adult, then that child should have the same procedural due 
process protections of an adults facing criminal prosecution.78 These rights 
include the right to government-funded counsel, the right against self-in­
crimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to timely notifica­
tion of charges.79 The Supreme Court found that the Arizona State 
legislature's establishment of state juvenile delinquency procedures, while it 
may well have intended to provide special protections for immature offend­
ers,80 had in fact functioned oppressively so much so that the Gault child was 
exposed to punishment significantly harsher than adults faced with similar 
infractions.81 
Certainly, children are accorded rights only to the extent it helps pre­
pare them "for the autonomous individuality of adulthood."82 In Plyler v. 
Doe,83 the Supreme Court posited that the state provision of education, in­
cluding the education of non-citizen children with or without valid immigra­
tion status, was not merely a legislative prerogative, but a necessary state 
action in a democratic society and a means for children to achieve gainful 
employment as adults. 84 While education itself is not a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly,85 the Supreme 
Court nevertheless concluded that "[i]n sum, education has a fundamental 
role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the signifi­
cant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the 
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests."86 
77 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that 
older children in school have the same constitutional right to free speech that adults do); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles in delinquency proceedings have the same 
constitutional rights to due process as adults facing criminal prosecution). 
78 387 U.S. at 78. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at IS. 
81 Id. at 29. An alternative reason for the Court's concern over the process accorded to 
juveniles is not rooted in protecting the autonomy of a child, but rather in protecting the vul­
nerability of a child and the need to protect the child from state overreaching. See Dailey, 
supra note 2, at 2130. 
82 Fitzgerald, supra note 1I, al 30. 
83 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
84 Id. at 221. "In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and 
cullUral heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one 
of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting 
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit. ... But more directly, 
'education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."' 
Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
85 
"Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our 
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 35 (1973). 
86 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
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In these two cases, the Supreme Court, expounding on the liberal rights 
theory, required the State to affirmatively provide for children-in Gault it 
was procedural due process, while in Plyler it was K-12 education for all 
state residents regardless of immigration status-not because they were 
themselves individual rights holders, but only because they were conceptual­
ized as potential adults and potential future rational agents that would be 
participating in society. s7 
B. The Child Liberationist Movement: Children as a Minority Class 
in Need of Emancipation 
In reaction to both the progressive era reforms-advocating for a pater­
nalistic model for protecting children-and the traditional rights theorists­
contending that children are devoid of independent rights as children-the 
Children's Liberation Movement (led by John Holt, Richard Farson, and 
others) insisted that children should be seen as a minority group that de­
serves to have both adult freedom and self-determination rights, similar to 
other groups who have faced discrimination such as women and African­
Americans.88 Drawing on the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John 
Dewey,89 child liberationists argued that children deserve the right to partici­
pate fully in society and also opined "that children's voices were wrongly 
absent even from public discussions of children's rights."90 John Holt argued 
that children, "of whatever age," are equal and should be treated like adults 
under the law.91 Under this premise, children should have the right to vote, 
work for pay, sign contracts, manage their own educations, travel, and form 
their own families. 92 
87 Fitzgerald, supra note I I, at 31. 
88 RICHARD EVANS FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 10 (1974) (drawing parallels with the civil 
rights movement and women's liberation to children's liberation efforts); see generally JoHN 
HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974). 
89 Farson, in explaining the roots of the child liberation movement, traces its strong ideo­
logical commitment to freedom for children to the works of Rousseau and Dewey. See FAR­
SON, supra note 88, at 9 (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Barbara Foxley trans., 
Dutton 1974) (1762); JoHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938)). 
90 Minow, supra note 25, at 271 (citing Helen Baker, Growing Up Unheard, in THE CmL­
DREN's RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 187, 189 (Bea­
trice Goss & Ronald Goss eds., 1977) (citing two Harvard Educational Law Review issues on 
children's rights that do not contain any articles by people under the age of eighteen)). 
91 HOLT, supra note 88, at 18 (arguing that children should be granted eleven rights in­
cluding: the right to choose an alternative family framework; the right to information; the right 
to choose an education framework and self-education (Holt is considered the founder of home 
schooling in the United States); the right to work and enter into and perform economic transac­
tions; the right to sexual freedom; the right to vote; the right to be educated in accordance with 
a child's characteristics; the right to protection against corporal punishment; and the right to 
justice). 
92 John Holt, Why Not a Bill of Rights for Children?, in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVE­
MENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 319, 324-25 (Beatrice Goss & Ron­
ald Goss eds., 1977). 
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Holt recognized that children do depend on others to care for them, feed 
them, keep them warm and clean, and protect them from harm.93 Yet, he 
extolled the example of twin boys, approximately four years old, whose par­
ents were either killed or taken prisoner during World War II, and managed 
to survive on their own in the midst of great poverty-"all by themselves." 94 
For Holt and other liberationists, humans "outgrow our physical helpless­
ness and dependency much sooner or faster than most people think."95 
Liberationists were suspicious of the idea of childhood; they believed it was 
a state construct instrumental in both suppressing and limiting the conduct of 
a class of individuals.96 For them, children did not always exist; they were 
invented.97 Once society was willing to embrace the concept of childhood, 
liberationists proffered that the government was only then able to establish a 
bright-line distinction between childhood and adulthood based on an arbi­
trary age distinction, and then use that manufactured divide to confer rights 
to some-adults-and to deny rights to others--children.98 
Moreover, children liberationists were convinced that governmental 
and parental decision making, rooted in child protection justifications, were 
in fact a guise to control, segregate, and program children to be obedient, 
well behaved, and complicit. The system was designed so that children were 
seen as lacking independent thinking and emotion.99 Therefore, these libera­
tionists argued, children, just as adults, are entitled by right to self-determi­
nation and should "have the right to exercise self-determination in decisions 
about eating, sleeping, playing, listening, reading, washing, and dressing." 100 
Likewise, children liberationists maintained that the family was not 
necessarily the natural and fundamental unit of society, and that children, 
like adults, had the right to choose alternative home environments101 when 
their parents failed to protect or affirmatively harmed them. Citing child 
abuse and torture102 by biological parents as evidence, Farson posited, "while 
the natural parents of the child do not necessarily make the best parents it is 
abundantly clear that they make the worst ones."103 
Though children under this theory have a right to leave a horrific family 
environment and seek an alternative living arrangement, a child has no right 
to state protection from violence or other maltreatment. For liberationists, 
93 Hrn.T, supra note 88. at 23. 
94 Id. at 24 
95 Id. at 24-25. 
96 FARSON, supra note 88, at 17-25. 
97 Id. at 17 (arguing that childhood is a European invention of the sixteenth century). 
98 HOLT, supra note 88, al 26. 
99 FARSON, supra note 88, at 2. 
100 Id. at 27. 
rni Id. at 42. 
102 Farson details examples of horrific abuse: "[c]hildren are tied, gagged, whipped, sys­
tematically exposed to electric shock, made to swallow all kinds of noxious materials such as 
pepper, dirt, feces, urine, vinegar, alcohol; their skulls and bones have been broken-some­
times repeatedly-their faces and bodies lacerated, their eyes pounded, even gouged out." Id. 
at 47. 
103 Id. at 47-48. 
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"asking what is good for children is beside the point[,]" 104 and it is this 
callous indifference regarding children's developmental and age appropriate 
needs that fuels much of the criticism towards the liberationist view of chil­
dren's rights. 105 
C. Reclaiming the Rights Rhetoric 
While both the traditional liberal rights and child liberationist models 
are inadequate in fully articulating what obligations a state owes to children 
or under what circumstances a state should refrain from interfering with a 
child's decision-making powers, does that necessarily mean these rights the­
ories are not instructive tools for framing the law? After dissecting the criti­
ques of the rights discourse, Professor Cass Sunstein bluntly resolved, "the 
real question is not whether we should have rights, but what rights should 
we have."106 This conclusion can be applied to children as well. 107 
"Admittedly children's rights present a particularly difficult case for 
rights theorists, mainly due to the children's limited capacities, greater vul­
nerabilities, and dependency on others."'°8 In Making All the Difference: 
Inclusion, Exclusion and American law, Professor Martha Minow argues 
that if rights are only understood as emanating from an autonomous rational 
male, then rights function to differentiate and effectively silence differ­
ence_l!l9 Undeniably, Minow argues that law's dilemma is to ameliorate the 
unfair consequences of the powerless without further reducing their 
power. 110 So for Minow, and others, if rights, particularly children's rights, 
can speak to more than just autonomy, there is power in reclaiming the 
rights rhetoric. In particular, children's rights should include a child's needs, 
"especially the central need for relationships with adults who are themselves 
enabled to create settings where children can thrive." 111 Moreover, needs 
should be placed within the rights talk because "basic needs are not only the 
justification of having rights; they also identify the nature of many of chil­
dren's rights." 112 Therefore, the task of reimagining and reclaiming rights as 
tools of power and protection for children requires constructing a rights 
framework that embodies positive rights such as participation, education, 
104 Id. at 31. 

105 GAL, supra note 2, at 17. 

106 Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRG DAME L. REv. 727, 757-58 

(1995) (summarizing the six thematic critiques on rights: rights are social and collective in 
nature, not inherently individual; rights are too rigid and do not allow for "competing consid­
erations"; rights are indeterminate and do not provide answers on how to handle particular 
problems; rights promote excessive individualism and undesirable characteristics such as self­
ishness and indifference; rights are too readily invoked to protect existing unjust discrimina­
tion; and rights obscure and crowd out the issue of responsibilities). 
107 GAL, supra note 2, at 17. 
108 Id. at 13. 
im M1Now, supra note 56, at 152-56. 
110 Id. at 3IO. 
111 Id. at 306. 
112 GAL, supra note 2, at 3 I. 
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protecting critical relationships to others such as family, and shelter,m while 
simultaneously articulating what rights/liberties are immune from govern­
ment interference. 
III. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD'S CONCOMITANT 

MANDATES: THE STATE'S DUTY TO PROTECT CHILDREN'S NEEDS AND 

REALIZE THEIR INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS 

The child shall in all circumstances be among the first to re­
ceive protection and relief. 
Article III, 1924 Geneva Declaration 
After over a decade, a working group established in 1979 by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights negotiated and drafted the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 114 This effort ulti­
mately resulted in 41 substantive articles, including extensive provisions on 
implementation and monitoring,115 which were ratified collectively in record 
time. "[N]o other specialized United Nations human rights treaty has en­
tered into force so quickly and been ratified by so many states in such a short 
period of time," 116 making it the most universally adopted human rights 
charter to date. 117 So far, 194 States have become parties to the treaty. In 
1995, the United States signed the CRC;118 however, despite its pivotal role 
in drafting the treaty, 119 the United States has not ratified it. The only other 
UN member countries that have not ratified the treaty are Somalia and South 
Sudan. 120 Although the U.S. has signed, but not ratified the CRC, it is still 
"obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the 
agreement." 121 In addition, non-refoulement is considered to be customary 
113 David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurispruden­
tial Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 21-23 (1980). 
114 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into 
force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
115 LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: UNITED NA­
TIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (1995). 
116 /d. at 45. 
"
7 Id. 
118 Multilateral Trealies Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as al 29 January 
2015, UNrrED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://treaties.un.org/ 
PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= IV-11 &chapter=4&lang=en, archived 
at http://perma.cc/25Z2-XG4R [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties Deposited]. 
119 See generally Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting The Conven­
tion on the Rights of the Child: Creating a New World for Children, 4 Lov. PovERTY L.J. 9 
(1998). 
120 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited, supra note 118. 
121 RESTATEMENf (THIRD) OF THE fuREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNffED STATES 
§ 312(3) (1987); see also id. § 312 cmts. d, i. 
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international law or }us cogens. 122 As such, the U.S. is bound by the CRC's 
non-refoulement obligation. 123 
The CRC's central contribution to the rights discourse is its situation of 
children not in relation to their parents or the State, but as independent rights 
holders regardless of their lack of autonomy. 124 Thus, the treaty recognizes a 
State's responsibility to not simply refrain from interference in a child's life, 
but also to affirmatively realize positive rights-independent of social con­
tract theory-including right to survival, which includes the right to basic 
necessities such as health care, social security, and freedom from poverty. 125 
This human rights approach, which develops a broader understanding of 
children's rights, is based on a child's entitlement to dignity, respect, and 
freedom from arbitrary treatment. 126 The CRC enumerates the interests and 
needs of children that must be considered by States, including, but not lim­
ited to, "the three P's:"127 "provision" (fulfillment of basic needs such as 
right to food, health care, and education); 128 "protection" (the right to "be 
shielded from harmful acts or practices" such as commercial or sexual ex­
ploitation and involvement in warfare); 129 and "participation" (the right "to 
be heard on decisions affecting one's own life'').'30 Overall the CRC, "for 
the first time, acknowledged children as individuals fully entitled to human 
rights-civil, political, economic, social, and cultural-without neglecting 
their special needs for protection."131 
The individual articles and responsibilities of the States, pursuant to the 
CRC, are situated in a framework consisting of four guiding principles: non­
discrimination; 132 best interest of the child as the primary consideration; 133 
right to life, survival, and development; 134 and participation. 135 These princi­
122 Alice Farmer, Non-refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-terror Measures that 
Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. I, 23-28 (reviewing arguments from 
UNHCR, Lauterpacht, Allian, and others that non-refoulement is customary international law 
or jus cogens). 
123 
"If a norm qualifies as jus cogens, that is a peremptory norm of international law, then 
a persistent objection. reservation, or a 'controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci­
sion' does not excuse U.S. violation of that norm." DAvm WEISSBRODT ET AL., IN'mRNA­
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 894 (4th ed. 2009). 
124 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: The Role and Place of Inter­
national Law in the Pursuit ofDurable Solutions, 3 !NTL J. CHILDREN'S Rrs. 405, 410 (1995). 
125 LEBLANC, supra note 115, 77--80. 
126 Minow, supra note 25, at 296 (noting that rights talk for children includes child libera­
tion, child protection, and social welfare and redistribution). 
127 Thomas Hammarberg, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child--l.md How to 
Make It Work, 12 HuM. R'rs. Q. 97, 99-101 (1990)­
128 CRC, supra note 114, at art. 24. 
129 Id. at art. 38. 
130 Id. at art. 12. 
131 GAL, supra note 2, at 35 (citing SHARON DETRICK, J.E. DORK & N1GEL CAN'l'WELL, 
nm UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX 
PREPARATO IRES" 27 (1992) ). 
132 CRC, supra note 114, at art. 2. 
133 Id. at art. 3. 
134 Id. at art. 6. 
135 Id. at art. 12. 
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pies are to be applied to, as well as to inform, the other articles of the Con­
vention. In addition, the CRC incorporates two important human rights 
doctrines: first, that the family is the fundamental unit of society; and sec­
ond, that States have an affirmative duty to not return or "refoul" a person to 
certain harm. 
A. The CRC's Four Guiding Principles: Non-discrimination; the Best 

Interest of the Child as the Primary Consideration; the Right to Life, 

Survival, and Development; and Participation 

Non-discrimination, the first principle under the CRC, requires equal­
ity; all children should have the same rights-de jure and de facto-regard
less of where a child lives, to what minority group a child belongs, whether 
the child was born in or out of wedlock, whether or not the child has a 
disability, and whether or not the child is residing in her homeland. 136 This 
principle does not mean that all children must receive exactly the same re­
sources, protections, or freedoms; rather, "[t]o achieve substantive equality, 
a legal system has to be sensitive to the inequalities of children and provide 
them with the required means to overcome these inequalities as much as 
possible in order to provide all children equal opportunities."137 Under the 
non-discrimination principle, non-national migrants, refugees, and asylum 
seekers shall be treated equally as native children. 138 This principle requires 
host countries to adopt policies that enable the full inclusion of those who 
might be considered different, 139 including immigrants. 
Second, the Convention's best interests principle creates a duty for 
States to conduct an individual assessment of a child's interest and not rely 
"on general assumptions regarding children in different situations."140 In 
fact, "the best interests standard may be regarded as being a general overall 
theme of the Convention. It appears eight times in the fifty-four-article Con­
vention, in addition to being one of its governing General Principles. This 
elevates the standard to being the most important international standard cur­
rently regulating decisions regarding the child." 141 States are required to 
weigh this individualized interest against all other competing state interests, 
such as cost and efficiency, and the child's interest should take precedence 
over any other considerations. The best interest standard, read in concert 
with the non-refoulement obligation of the Convention that is discussed at 
136 GAL, supra note 2, at 37. 
137 Id. 
ns Id. 
139 Martha Minow argues that the way to move beyond the dilemma of difference is not to 
avoid or notice difference because that undermines equality, but to see difference as relational 
and work to remake institutions that accommodate difference instead of using difference as a 
way to exclude individuals. M1Now, supra note 56, at 375-80. 
140 GAL, supra note 2, at 39. 
141 BREEN, supra note 34, at 78-79 (summarizing how the best interest of the child stan­
dard was negotiated among the Working Group and Member States and its ultimate articula­
tion in Article 3 of the Convention). 
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greater length later in this Article, means that the prerogative of a State to 
exclude non-citizens from crossing its borders cannot take precedence over 
what is in the best interest of an individual child. In some instances, families 
may decide that it is not in the best interest of their children to remain in the 
home, and in other instances families may sell their children for sex or la­
bor.142 Therefore, the United States cannot summarily deport children seek­
ing sanctuary without first conducting a case-by-case assessment of each 
child's best interests143 and determining whether or not the child would face 
irreparable harm if returned to his or her country of origin. 144 
In addition, the right to life, survival, and development principle neces­
sarily compels States to protect children from violence. 145 Children exposed 
to violence, including sexual abuse and exploitation, can suffer serious nega­
tive short-term and long-term effects to their development. 146 Article 6.2 of 
the CRC, which reads, "States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child[,]" is closely related to 
the CRC' s Article I 9 requirement that States provide protection against child 
abuse. 147 In addition, the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarded the 
principle of right to life, survival, and development as creating an affirma­
tive obligation to protect children from violence both in their home and from 
the society at large. 148 Children fleeing violence should have the ability to 
seek protection from their country of nationality, and to the extent that coun­
try is unable to provide protection, the CRC contemplates other states pro­
viding surrogate state protection. 149 
Finally, the right to participation principle requires that, in decisions 
concerning a child, that child has "more than a right to be heard, but less 
than a right to independent decision making."150 The Convention's view is 
distinct from the aforementioned child liberationists who posit that children, 
as rational and autonomous agents, should be able to make their own deci­
sions. Rather, Article I 2 of the Convention recognized for the first time. in a 
child-focused international instrument that "the views of the child be[] 
142 Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization and the Transnational Mi­
gration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. RouNDTADLE 269, 271-73 (2000). 
143 Or-HCE OF THE U.N. H1GH CoMM'R r-oR REFUGEES, A THEMATIC CoMPILATION or- Ex­
Ecu-r1vE COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS 87 (7th ed. June 2014), archived at http://penna.cc/G3TF­
EHF6. 
144 Alice Fanner, A Commentary on Committee on the Rights of the Child's Definition on 
Non-Refoulement for Children: Broad Protection for Fundamental Rights, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. RES GESTAE 39, 41-43 (2011). 
145 GAL, supra note 2, at 42. 
146 Gayla Margolin & Elana B. Gordis, The Effects of Family and Community Violence on 
Children, 51 ANN. REV. PsYCHOL. 445, 449-52 (2000); see also OLA W. BARNE"IT ET AL., 
FAMILY VIOLENCE ACROSS THE Lif'ESPAN: AN [NTRODUCrION 3, 152-55 (3d ed. 2011). 
147 GAL, supra note 2, at 41-42. 
148 Id. at 42. 
149 See CRC, supra note 114, at art. 22.1 (requiring States Parties to provide the appropri­
ate protection and humanitarian assistance "in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in 
the present Convention and other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to 
which the said States are Parties."). 
150 GAL, supra note 2, at 45. 
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given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child[,]" 151 
and that a "child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard 
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either di­
rectly, or through a representative or an appropriate body[.]" 152 This princi­
ple differs from the child liberationists' claim that children, with rights to 
self-determination and autonomy, are entitled to make their own decisions 
without adult consultation. The CRC's principle also distinguishes itself 
from parens patriae models, which assume children are incapable of expres­
sing opinions and preferences. Under the CRC's principle, immigrant chil­
dren's preferences and opinions should be accorded deference in the law and 
given due weight in relation to their age and maturity .153 
B. The CRC's Key Human Rights Law Obligations: Primacy of Family 
and Non-Refoulement 
First, consistent with international law and similar treaties, the CRC 
recognizes "the right to respect for family life," specifically, the critical im­
portance of the family unit to children. 154 With respect to the family unit, the 
two following key doctrines have been incorporated into various interna­
tional treaties: (1) that family is the natural and fundamental unit of society, 
and (2) that maintaining the family unit is in the best interests of the child. 155 
In recognition of the family as society's fundamental unit, the CRC pro­
vides that, "the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particu­
larly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so 
that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community." 156 This 
standard, which is repeated throughout international law, not only recognizes 
family as a "natural and fundamental unit of society," but also places an 
affirmative duty on the state to provide for its protection. 157 
The CRC also explicitly recognizes that a child's "best interests" are, as 
far as possible, in the maintenance of the family unit. 158 As previously men­
tioned, the CRC provides that the "best interest of the child shall be [the] 
primary consideration" in all actions concerning children. 159 Moreover, con­
151 CRC, supra note 114, at art. 12.1. 

152 Id. at art. 12.2. 

153 See id. at art. 12.1. 

154 See Ryan T. Mzazki & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Protecting and Promoting the Human 

Right to Respect for Family Life: Treaty Based Reform and Domestic Advocacy, 24 GEo. IM­
MIGR. L.J. 651, 652-54 (2010). 
155 Id. at 652. 
156 Id. (quoting CRC, supra note 114, at Preamble). 
157 Id. at 652-53. 
158 See id. at 653-54 (arguing that it can be inferred from certain provisions, such as art. 
9.1, which puts "a ban on the separation of a child from his or her parents, except by compe­
tent authorities subject to judicial review[,]" that the CRC links the "best interest of the 
child" with the "maintenance of the family unit"). 
159 CRC, supra note 114, at art. 3.1. 
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sistent with international law principles, the CRC respects the family unit by 
giving the child the "right to ... be cared for by his or her parents." 160 
Accordingly, as the recognized fundamental unit of society, interna­
tional law reflects that the family unit is both primarily responsible for and 
best suited to providing for the needs and care of children. 161 Therefore, ad­
verse immigration action, "from denial of entry to forced removal to separa­
tion from a caretaker to detention," against any one individual of the family 
unit is an interference of these principles. 162 
Equally important is the CRC's non-refoulement duty, which "is one of 
the most expansive definitions in international law." 163 The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child states that, "in fulfilling obligations under the Con­
vention, States shall not return a child to a country where there are substan­
tial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the 
child." 164 
The Committee cites Articles 6 (rights to life and survival) and 37 
(rights to liberty and freedom from torture) as instances that would qualify 
as irreparable harm to a child. 165 The CRC binds States to not only refrain 
from interfering with the political rights of children, but also requires that 
States affirmatively protect children from harm perpetrated by other States 
or private actors. 166 Arguably, for migrant children fleeing irreparable harm 
from their home countries, there is an affirmative obligation on States to 
provide protection by not returning the children to their homes. 167 Under the 
CRC, the non-refoulement of children applies in more instances than it does 
for adults. 168 "Ultimately, the underlying risk of 'irreparable harm' to indi­
vidual children is non-negotiable: their interests cannot be traded away." 169 
160 See id. at art. 7. I. 
161 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 
1114-15 (2011) (recognizing that the designation of the "care and upbringing of children," 
which is implicit in the European National Convention and explicit in German Basic Law, 
creates "both a right and a duty incumbent on parents"). 
162 See Mzazki & Schoenholtz, supra note 154, at 670. 
163 Farmer, supra note 144, at 41. 
164 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompa­
nied and Separated Children Outside Their Country ofOrigin, 'II 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/ 
6 (Sept. 6, 2005). 
165 Id. 
166 See Farmer, supra note 144, at 41. 
167 Id. at 47. 
168 See id. at 45 (arguing that the United Kingdom had an affirmative obligation not to 
return Afghan children to Afghanistan if "the conditions for children's rights in Afghanistan 
are sufficiently adverse that there may be a 'real risk of irreparable harm'"). 
169 Id. at 48. 
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IV. CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION LAW DEVOID OF RIGHTS AND NEEDS 
With a few notable exceptions, 170 U.S. immigration Jaw fails in its en­
tirety to recognize immigrants as rights bearers. 171 The Supreme Court of the 
United States has ruled that immigration, and the right to regulate which 
individuals are allowed to enter the United States, is a power of the sover­
eign.172 Further, the Court, applying the plenary power doctrine, has refused 
to overturn or invalidate immigration statutes (including those that discrimi­
nate on race, national origin, and political opinion), when holding that immi­
gration is a matter "vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous 
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of ... government ... exclusively entrusted to the political 
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference." 173 Moreover, the Court has also stated that, "over no other 
area is the legislative power more 'complete' than immigration." 174 It is the 
U.S. Congress that enacts Jaws determining who can enter the United States, 
under what conditions, and for how long. 175 Congress also establishes who 
can be removed from the United States based on acts committed after en­
try.176 Such individual immigrants have no legal basis to challenge these de­
cisions because they have no legal right to remain-entry is a privilege. It is 
170 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (detailing the 1980 Refugee 
Act's establishment of a statutory asylum process to fulfill the United States' international 
obligations pursuant to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its subse­
quent 1968 Protocol); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFP ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 903--06 (7th ed. 2012) (describing congressional action to 
incorporate the United States' Article 3 obligations of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment into the Immigration and Na­
tionality Act). 
171 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952) (holding that a 
noncitizen remaining in the United States is a "matter of pennission and tolerance"; it is not a 
right); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (concluding that "[t]he right 
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps 
towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and 
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country"). 
172 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi­
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1987) ("The Court also estab­
lished that the Constitution does not bar Congress from enacting laws inconsistent with 
international obligations of the United States and that the courts will give effect to an act of 
Congress inconsistent with provisions of an earlier treaty."); Adam Cox & Cristina M. Rodri­
guez, The President and Immigration ww, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 469 (2009) (citing the "Chinese 
Exclusion Case," Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)). 
173 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89; see also Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 172, at 460. 
174 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 172, at 461 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 
766 (1972)). 
175 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 12-24 (5th ed. 2009). 
176 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
5--0 (2007) (discussing two basic types of deportation laws: "extended border control" and 
"post-entry social control"). 
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no surprise then that "U.S. immigration law fails to fully recognize children 
as individuals with independent rights and interests." 177 
The next section of the Article first describes how immigration law 
generally-both in substance and process-fails to treat children as children. 
Highlighting two examples, this section argues that not only do U.S. immi­
gration laws need to be radically transformed, but so do the embedded cul­
tural attitudes regarding what immigrant children need, how they should be 
treated, and what rights of theirs must be realized. 
A. Children Are Not Property, Wards, or Adults-They Are Persons: 

Professor David Thronson's Critique 

Current treatment of children by immigration law and policy is funda­
mentally flawed, argues Professor David Thronson, 178 because it treats chil­
dren both as objects 179 and adults, 180 but not individual rights holders. 181 This 
dilemma pervades both the substantive immigration relief available to chil­
dren and the procedure by which such relief is granted. 182 
Immigration law processes and treats most non-citizen children as. the 
derivatives of adults. 183 Under immigration law, status as a child is greatly 
significant because if the individual is a non-citizen child, he or she can 
derive the status of a qualifying parent, but only when that parent applies for 
177 David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration 
Law, 38 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 396 (2010). 
178 Thronson, supra note 15; David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the 
Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006) [hereinafter Choiceless Choices] (high­
lighting how an immigrant child is volleyed as an object between parents and the State when 
parents facing deportation make claims about the harm their children will suffer if they are 
deported and the reaction of the state child welfare systems to a parent's decision to preserve 
family unity by potentially placing his or her child in harm's way if deported). · 
179 Thronson, supra note 15, at 991-97 (arguing that current immigration law recognizes 
children primarily as dependents of the family, and "children are conceived as objects rather 
than actors, and their voices are largely ignored"). 
180 Id. at 997-1003 (arguing that if immigrant children are unaccompanied while in the 
United States, that is without a parent or guardian, immigration law treats them as adults by 
default, which is problematic because there are no remedies or procedures that are tailored for 
children, and consequently children are left unprotected and without a voice). 
181 Id. at 989 (advocating that the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes child 
rights as human rights centering on the personhood of children); see also Minow, supra note 
25, at 296 (advocating that children should be seen as human beings that deserve dignity and 
respect, even if they cannot act autonomously, like all others in the international Jaw 
framework). 
182 Thronson, supra note 15, at 99{}-91. 
183 Id. at 991. The majority of these applications are family-sponsored immigration, the 
bulk of the total legal immigration. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA­
TION STATISTICS: 2013, tbl. 7, available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statis 
tics-2013-Iawful-perrnanent-residents, archived at http://perma.cc/SH28-P9SX. Of the 990,553 
permanent visas issued, 439,460 were issued to immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens and 
210,303 were issued to other family preference categories. There are other instances, such as 
diversity lottery, asylum, and refugee status, in which children can derive status from the 
qualifying parent. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 153(d) (diversity lottery), I 157(c)(2) (refugee), l 158(b)(3) 
(asylum) (2012). 
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such relief. 184 In fact, Thronson notes, "[e]mphasizing dependence on par­
ents as a prerequisite to being a 'child' strongly reflects notions of the child 
as property." 185 Under the current framework, a child lacks the ability to 
affirmatively ask for recognition or status on account of a family relation­
ship; put more simply, they are at the mercy of the qualifying parent. 186 In 
fact, children are not permitted to petition for others, such as siblings or a 
parent, even if the child is a U.S. citizen. 187 
Equally concerning is the fact that young parents who are under 21 (a 
child under the INA) have no avenue to pursue immigration relief for their 
child because "derivative status extends only one generation from the princi­
pal beneficiary. A young parent who otherwise qualifies as a child cannot 
immigrate as a derivative without leaving her child behind." 188 In addition, a 
child's dependence on a parent to apply for status means that the ultimate 
decision maker will often not consider the child's own independent claim for 
immigration relief. For example, in the case of refugees, "[a]ccompanied 
children have tended to be submitted within their family's asylum applica­
tion; indeed, both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the INS have pointed out that invisibility is a common problem for refugee 
children." 189 Even when a child's immigration status is aligned with that of 
184 In immigration law, if the principal beneficiary has a spouse and child at the time an 
immigrant benefit is conferred, the beneficiary can petition to have the spouse and child ac­
quire immigration status as derivatives. 8 U.S.C. § I I 53(d). 
185 Thronson, supra note 15, at 992. Immigration law defines a child as an unmarried 
person under twenty-one years of age who falls into one of six categories: (I) "a child born in 
wedlock"; (2) a stepchild, "provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the 
time of the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred"; (3) "a child legitimated ... if 
such legitimation takes place before the child reaches eighteen years and the child is in the 
legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation"; (4) "a 
child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit 
is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if 
the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person"; (5) "a child 
adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal custody of, and 
has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years"; or (6) "a child, under 
the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf ... who is an orphan" and whose 
adoptive parents have "complied with the preadoption requirements." 8 U.S.C. 
§ l IOl(b)(l)(A)-(F). In addition, if children marry or reach the age of twenty-one, they are 
categorically not considered "children" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, but rather 
are defined as "sons" or "daughters." 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(l). 
186 Thronson recounts the case of Boguslaw Fornalik to illustrate the dependency the child 
has on the adult petitioner for immigration status. Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 527-28 
(7th Cir. 2000). In this case, seventeen-year-old Boguslaw discovered that his abusive father 
failed to include him in an immigration petition. This omission resulted in Boguslaw's deporta­
tion back to Poland and leaving his mother and siblings in the United States. See Thronson, 
supra note 15, at 994. 
187 It is only after the U.S. citizen child turns twenty-one, and is no longer classified as a 
child but rather an adult under the INA, that he or she could apply for derivative status for 
parents or siblings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 115 l(b)(2)(A)(i) (parents of U.S. citizen adults are classified 
as immediate relatives and not subject to numerical limitations on allowable visas), 1153(a)(4) 
(eligibility for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens for family immigrant based visas). 
188 Thronson, supra note 15, at 994. 
189 Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child 
Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 87 (1999). 
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his or her parents, Thronson notes that, "although this version of family 
integrity does, in most instances, tend to keep children together with parents, 
it has no concern for where the family ends up or for children whose parents 
are unable to or choose not to assist them." 190 
In contrast, for children who do not share the same status as their par­
ents, immigration law automatically treats them as adults. 191 Unaccompanied 
minors-children without a parent or legal guardian to provide care and 
physical custodyl92-that arrive at the border are only eligible to apply for 
the same types of immigration relief as an adult. Immigration law does not 
"tailor substantive or procedural protections to their age or developmenl."193 
Children, like adults, must navigate the complex immigration system and 
have no right to government-funded or appointed counsel, which means they 
may be forced to navigate the immigration courts pro se. 194 
While children may in certain instances serve as the principal applicant 
for immigration relief, including asylum and U and T visas, the only child­
centered immigration benefit currently available to children in the immigra­
tion system is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).195 The Obama ad­
ministration under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program 196 has decided to defer placing certain individuals who came to the 
United States as children 197 in removal proceedings and permitted work au­
thorization for those meeting the requirements of DACA. 198 DACA, however, 
19°Choiceless Choices, supra note 178, at 1182. 

191 Thronson, supra note 15, at 1000-04. 

192 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 

193 Choiceless Choices, supra note 178, at 1186. 

194 Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A Legislative Proposal ta Address the Ris­

ing Cost.v and Unmet Legal Need1· of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 643, 
649-50 (2012) (discussing the barriers to accessing competent representation for imm.igrants 
in removal proceedings). 
195 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2012). 
196 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Agui­
lar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Memo from 
Janet Napolitano]. 
197 Congress has introduced multiple bills to provide relief to this unauthorized immigrant 
student population, which has often been entitled the "Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors Act," or the DREAM Act. Yet, despite various congressional attempts to provide 
status to this select group of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States, there have 
been no changes in the law and this group still has no path to permanent status in the United 
States. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development: The Development, Relief, and Education far 
Alien Minors (DREAM Act), 48 HARV. J. ON Lnrns. 623, 632-37 (2011) (summarizing the 
failed attempts to enact various versions of the DREAM Act from 2001-2011). 
198 The criteria detailed in the memorandum include: (1) "has continuously resided in the 
United States for at least five years preceding the date of this memorandum and is present in 
the United States on the date of this memorandum"; (2) "is currently in school, has graduated 
from high school, has obtained a general education development certificate, or is honorably 
discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States"; (3) "has not 
been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor 
offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety"; (4) "came to the 
United States under the age of sixteen"; and (5) "is not above the age of thirty." Memo from 
Janet Napolitano, supra note 196. 
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does not confer any immigration benefit or put the individual on a path to 
permanent status in the United States. 199 
Granted, asylum is potentially an option for some unaccompanied chil­
dren to secure immigration relief in the United States; however, adjudicators 
are skeptical of granting children asylum under novel legal theories like 
claims of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group, 
such as children fleeing gang violence or abuse in the home.200 So while 
some children are able to gain refugee status through the asylum process, 
many do not qualify for such relief. 201 
For a child to be eligible for SUS, he or she must be present in the 
United States. Second, the child must be "declared dependent on a juvenile 
court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally commit­
ted to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State ... 
and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's parents is not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 
State law."202 According to DHS regulations, "long term foster care" means 
"that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family 
reunification is no longer a viable option."203 The juvenile court also must 
make a finding "that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned 
to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last 
habitual residence."204 Immigration status is not conferred by the juvenile 
court; rather, once the juvenile court issues an order with a finding of fact, 
the child must still apply to DHS for immigration status.205 DHS adjudicates 
the application and if there are no grounds of inadmissibility, then the child 
may be granted SUS status, which confers on him or her legal permanent 
status to remain in the United States.206 However, the child is permanently 
barred from petitioning for his or her non-abusive parent207 to derive status 
from the child's SUS status, severing any possibility of family unity. 208 
Even with this child-centered immigration visa, which requires the fact­
finding of child welfare experts, problems with its implementation are com­
199 See id. 
200 See Lauren R. Aronson, The Tipping Point: The Failure of Form Over Substance in 
Addressing the Needs of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children, 18 HARV. LATINO L. REv. I 
(2015) (discussing challenges unaccompanied children face to being granted asylum in the 
United States). 
201 See id. 
202 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012). 
203 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (a) (2013). 
204 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(ii). 
205 Id. § I IOl(a)(27)(J)(iii). 
206 Id. § I 255(h). There are some specific waivers of inadmissibility for SUS applicants 
and those waivers are adjudicated by DHS. Id. 
201 The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(l)(A), 122 Stat. 5044, 5079, amended the INA to only require 
that the petitioner show that only one parent has abused, abandoned, or neglected the immi­
grant child, not both. 
208 8 U.S.C. § l IOl(a)(27)(J)(iii)(ll). This is not the only immigrant status where a child 
who is principal applicant cannot petition for his or her parents. Only children and spouses can 
derive asylum status from the principal applicant. Id. § I I 58(b)(3)(A). 
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monplace.209 Namely, DHS "has failed to break free of its dominant modes 
of thinking about children. The result has been a usurpation of the juvenile 
court role and the creation of substantial barriers for abused, neglected, and 
abandoned children seeking immigration relief."210 Unless and until struc­
tural changes are made in the immigration system, which will not only trans­
form the process and relief available to children, but the culture as well, 
children will continue to be seen as objects or adults in miniature bereft of 
any rights that safeguard their child-specific needs. 
B. 	 A Contemporary Case Study: The Policy Response to Unaccompanied 
Children at Our Border 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that by the end 
of this Fiscal Year (September 30, 2014 ), upwards of 90,000 unaccompanied 
minors will enter the United States,211 up from 24,668 in 2013.212 Not only is 
the number of children fleeing the region on the rise, but also their reasons 
for flight have shifted. Prior to 2011, most children left their home countries 
to reunite with family living in the United States. Now, most of the children 
are fleeing because of armed criminal violence, which is often caused by 
gangs or drug cartels, as well as horrific abuse at home.213 These children are 
primarily fleeing from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,214 where mur­
zm Thronson, supra note 15, at 1009. 
210 Id. Thronson highlights through case examples how OHS (fonner INS) often attempts 
to revisit the juvenile court's best interest finding or, even more detrimental to the child, refuse 
to consent to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Id. at 1009-13. 
rn Richard Fausset & Ken Belson, Faces ofan Immigration System Overwhelmed by Wo­
men and Children, N.Y. TiMES, June 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/us/faces­
of-an-immigration-system-overwhelmed-by-women-and-children.html?_r=O, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RJR5-7NZB. The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee further estimates that 
this number could rise to as high as 145,000 in FY 2015. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on 
Appropriations, Chairwoman Mikulski Prepared Remarks: FYI 5 LHHS Subcommittee 
Markup (June 10, 2014), available at http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/chairwoman­
mikulski-prepared-remarks-fy 15-lhhs-subcommittee-markup, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
ZTY7-LFL9. 
212 See LISA FRYDMAN ET AL., A 11rnACHEROUS JOURNRY: CHILD MtGRANTs NJ\VIGATING 
THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2 (2014), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/centers/cgrs­
docs/treacherous_joumey_cgrs_kind_report.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/6ZZX-G7VL. 
213 See U.N. HIGH CoMM'R FOR REFUGEES REG'L OFFICE FOR THE U.S. AND THE CARIB­
BEAN, CHILDREN ON THE RuN: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVINO CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
MEXICO AND THE Nmm FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 24-25 (May 2014) [hereinafter 
CHILDREN ON THE RuN], available athttp://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC 
_Children %20on%20the%20Run_Full%20Report_May2014 .pdf, archived at http://perrna.cc/ 
73L2-UUHG; see also WOMEN'S REFUGEE CoMMN, FORCED FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS 
AND GIRLS or- CENTRAL AMrlRtCA I (2012) (noting that unaccompanied minors are subject not 
only to violent gang attacks, but also face targeting by police who mistakenly assume that they 
are gang-affiliated; additionally, girls in particular "face gender-based violence, as rape be­
comes increasingly a tool of control"). 
214 See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 213, at 16. The number of children coming 
from Mexico is also on the rise, but they are less visible because they are usually returned to 
Mexico after no more than a day or two in U.S. custody. Id. 
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der rates mirror that of conflict zones.215 These countries of origin are inun­
dated with various human rights violations, which are met with a complete 
lack of meaningful State protection.216 Indeed, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees recently concluded that at least 58% of unac­
companied children arriving from these countries were forcibly displaced 
and potentially in need of international protection.217 
As the current crisis escalated, many of these children were being 
housed at emergency shelters in icebox-cold cells-nicknamed hieleras, 
Spanish for freezers-with no access to food or medical care,218 while DHS 
attempted to establish which children may have an available sponsor in the 
United States to whom they could be released,219 while concurrently initiat­
ing removal proceedings against each child without valid immigration status. 
Under current immigration law, the only protections for these children are 
discrete and narrow forms of immigration relief. Currently, the most com­
mon forms of relief for unaccompanied minors are: asylum,220 special immi­
grant juvenile status (SIJS),221 and T and U visas.222 However, some children 
may legitimately fear violence or have suffered past harm but do not qualify 
for these forms of immigration relief. For example, fleeing generalized vio­
lence perpetrated by armed criminals or gang members, no matter how hor­
rific, is not grounds for asylum, SUS status, or T or U Visas.223 Such relief 
depends on if someone, such as an attorney, identifies the appropriate availa­
215 Press Release, Sens. Menendez, Durbin, Hirono, and Reps. Gutierrez and Roybal-Al­
lard Discuss Humanitarian and Refugee Children Crisis at the Border (June 19, 2014), availa­
ble at http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/sens-menendez-durbin-hirono-and­
reps-gutierrez-and-roybal-allard-discuss-humanitarian-and-refugee-children-crisis-at-the-bor 
der, archived at http://perma.cc/KLP2-VUJ5. 
216 U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA: THE FLIGHT OF 
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES 2 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www 
.usccb.org/about/migration-policy /upload/Mission-To-Central-America-FINAL-2. pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/EP5J-3FU3. 
217 CHILDREN ON THE RuN, supra note 213, at 25. 
218 Editorial, Innocents at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2014, www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/06/17/opinion/immigrant-children-need-safety-shelter-and-lawyers.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9973-3RPG. 
219 A "sponsor" includes, but is not limited to, the following individuals or entities listed 
in order of preference: a parent; a legal guardian; an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, 
or grandparent); an adult individual or entity designated by the child's parent or legal guardian 
as capable and willing to provide care. See OLGA BYRNE & EusE MILLER, VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 18 
(Mar. 2012) [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE]. 
220 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(42) (2012) (requiring the applicant prove a well-founded fear of 
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion). 
221 /d. § l 10l(a)(27)(J)(i}-(iii) (requiring a state court finding that the child has been 
abused, neglected, and abandoned and a determination by OHS that it is in the best interests of 
the child not to be returned to his or her home country but remain permanently in the United 
States). 
222 /d. §§ l 10l(a)(l5)(T), (U) (providing long-term protection for victims of certain severe 
crimes and human trafficking). 
223 See Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to Coun­
sel For Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J. 41, 59--60 (2011). 
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ble relief and actively assists the child with the application process. 224 Yet, 
children are not entitled to government-funded counsel and therefore often 
must proceed before an immigration judge alone. For other children, there is 
no available immigration relief; while they have witnessed unspeakable hor­
rors and have been the victims of violence and abuse, there is simply no 
legal answer to their calls for help. They are not simply migrants crossing 
international borders; they are emblematic of an international humanitarian 
crisis rapidly unfolding in Central America. 
In responding to this humanitarian crisis, multiple members of the 
Obama administration have called for statutory changes to the 2008 Traffick­
ing Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).225 In addition, mem­
bers of Congress have put forth legislation calling for treating Central 
American children in the same fashion as Mexican children under the 
TVPRA.226 
Under the TVPRA, there are special rules for children originating from 
contiguous states (Mexico and Canada), which include a presumption of im­
mediate return to their home country with no hearing before an immigration 
judge, unless the child is identified as a victim of severe trafficking, demon­
strates a credible fear of persecution, or is unable to make independent deci­
sions about his or her options. 227 A child capable of making decisions and 
who does not have such fears can be "permitted to withdraw" his or her 
application for admission and be sent home.228 The legislation calls for such 
screening to occur promptly (within 48 hours), but if such screening does not 
occur within 48 hours then that child is transferred to Health and Human 
Services.229 Safe repatriation of children to Mexico is presumably insured by 
contiguous country agreements and other procedures. 230 Even though the 
rules for contiguous states found at TVPRA § 235(a) are more permissive of 
quick return than for non-contiguous states, Congress passed the law in or­
224 See FRYDMAN, supra note 212, at 35-37 (discussing the failures of the current system 
to identify unaccompanied minors that are eligible for forms of relief such as Special Immi­
grant Juvenile Status, T Visas, and U visas). 
225 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. I I0-457, 122 Stat. 5044. 
226 On July 9, 2014, Senator Jeff Flake, along with several other Republican Senators 
including John McCain, introduced an amendment to S. 2363, the Sportsman's Heritage Act 
(the bill currently under floor consideration in the U.S. Senate) that calls for treating Central 
American children in the same fashion as Mexican children under the TVPRA. In addition, 
this amendment provides the OHS Secretary broad and unchecked discretion to expand this 
treatment to any child from any country the Secretary deems appropriate. S. 2363, I 13th Cong. 
(2014 ), available at http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/ _cache/files/e84629ca-603 f-4a9b­
b3fb-c413fl 59f7af/flake-tvpra-reform-amendment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K2M2­
JSB U. Senator John Comyn and Representative Henry Cuellar are planning on introducing a 
bill to amend the 2008 TVPRA and treat Central American children in the same fashion as 
Mexican children. Sureng Min Kim, Bill Aims to Quicken Border Process, Pounco (July 14, 
2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/immigrants-border-children-bill-108 
872.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R7EV-FNTM. 
227 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2)(A). 

228 Id. § 1232(a)(2)(B). 

229 Id. § 1232(a)(4). 

230 Id. §§ 1232(a)(2)(C), (5). 

84 Harvard Latino Law Review Vol. 18 
der to provide more protection for Mexican children than had been the case 
up to that point. 
In contrast, under the 2008 trafficking legislation, unaccompanied 
minors from noncontiguous states are placed in ordinary removal proceed­
ings-a long-standing immigration enforcement mechanism. Simultane­
ously, these children are transferred to facilities run by the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement ("ORR") where they are allowed to meet with social workers 
and attorneys experienced in working with children. In addition, and pursu­
ant to the TVPRA, HHS appoints independent child advocates for particu­
larly vulnerable unaccompanied children in the Rio Grande Valley and 
Chicago; their role is to meet with the children, learn their stories, and advo­
cate for their best interests. 
These proposed changes by both members of Congress and the Obama 
administration aptly illustrate the U.S. government's tendency to see children 
as illegal migrants first and foremost, with little regard for the child's rights 
and needs. These proposed policies violate children's rights by first, contra­
vening the Supreme Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
/nc.,231 and second, failing to provide for the children's physical and psycho­
logical protection needs, which run afoul of the U.S.'s international obliga­
tions to not return children to a country where "there are substantial grounds 
for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child.''232 
First, in Sale, the Supreme Court upheld President Reagan's interdiction 
program, which permitted the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict unauthorized 
migrants attempting to land in the U.S. on the high seas and return them to 
their country of origin without any advice about their right to seek protec­
tion.233 The Supreme Court found that the program did not violate the U.S.'s 
obligations under the Refugee Convention of non-refoulement-the obliga­
tion not to return an individual to a country where he or she may face serious 
harm-because the interdiction occurred on the high seas and not within 
U.S. territory.234 So while the interdiction program survived judicial scrutiny, 
Congress' and the Administration's proposals to fast track the deportation of 
unaccompanied minors with little, if any, process squarely violate the 
Court's Sale decision because obligations that do not apply on the high seas 
do in fact apply at our borders. 
Second, summarily deporting unaccompanied minors explicitly fails to 
incorporate the best interests of the child principle required by international 
law.235 Upon arrival, these children are hungry, sleep deprived, and scared. 
Additionally, they are coming from countries where there is a high degree of 
231 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
232 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 164, 'II 27. 
233 509 U.S. 155. 
234 Id. at 187-88. 
235 See generally Carr, supra note 44; see also International Covenant on Civil and Politi­
cal Rights an. 24(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Every child 
shall have, without any discrimination as to ... national or social origin ... the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the pan of his family, 
society and the State."). 
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mistrust of government officials. Indeed, they may even be fleeing govern­
ment persecution. Immediately subjecting these young children to a cursory 
and arbitrary interview by a law enforcement officer risks children failing to 
fully articulate why they are afraid or why they cannot return. Swift deporta­
tion risks that such children will be repatriated to unsafe conditions, includ­
ing continued physical and sexual abuse, gang recruitment, and other forms 
of criminal violence.236 
C. Parents Without Status: Severing Family Unity in the Name of the 

Best Interest of the Child 

When a parent's lack of immigration status results in an arrest, his or 
her child often enters the child welfare system. These children are both in­
voluntarily taken from their parents and placed in the custody of strangers­
all in the name of the best interest of the child standard.237 According to a 
2011 report by the Applied Research Center, there were at least 5100 chil­
dren living in foster care whose parents had either been detained or de­
ported.238 This report also found that the "research clearly indicates that once 
children of noncitizens are removed from the custody of their parents, their 
families are subjected to particular and deep systemic failures to reunifica­
tion."239 When immigration officials apprehend an undocumented parent, 
there is often no opportunity for the parent to make arrangements for child­
236 Appleseed Foundations of the United States, in a 2011 report evaluating the ability of 
the current U.S. government screening policy of Mexican children to adequately identify po­
tential refugees and victims of trafficking, concluded that: "[i]n the United States, TVPRA 
screening is not conducted either in a manner or in environments likely to elicit information 
that would indicate whether the minor is a potential victim of trafficking or abuse, and whether 
the child can and does voluntarily agree to return to Mexico. This failure predictably follows 
DHS's decision to assign TVPRA screening duties to its law enforcement branch, Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), a force intended to repel external threats to the United States and, 
not surprisingly, without any child welfare expertise. The minimal training and tools provided 
to CBP officers have done little to equip them to satisfy the Congressional mandates of the 
TVPRA. As a result, the expected post-TVPRA influx of unaccompanied Mexican minors into 
the U.S. system designed to evaluate their rights to protection has not materialized, leaving 
many of these children vulnerable to trafficking and other forms of exploitation, including by 
criminal gangs and drug cartels." BETSY CAVENDISH & MARU CoRTAZAR, APPLESEED, CHIL­
DREN AT THE BORDER: THE SCREENING, PROTECrION AND REPATRIATION OF UNACCOMPANIED 
MEXICAN MINORS 2 (2011 ), available at http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/05/Children-At-The-Borderl .pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KG2Q-ZANF. 
237 See generally Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. 
& Soc. JusT. 63 (2012) (arguing that the best interest of the child standard is being used 
unjustly as a tool to separate, remove, and terminate parental rights in instances where children 
have a right to remain in the United States and the parent is subject to deportation). 
238 SETH FREED WESSLER, SHA'ITERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECrION OF IMMI­
GRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS 6 (201 I), available al http://www 
.atlanticphilanthropies.org/si tes/default/files/uploads/ ARC_Report_Shattered_Fami lies_FULL 
_REPORT_Nov201 I Release.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E53B-428G. The report also 
found that currently there are approximately 5.5 million children living in the United States 
who have an undocumented parent, and about 4.5 million of these children are U.S. citizens. 
Id. at 10. 
239 Id. at 17. 
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care and immigration officials refuse to release parents during the pendency 
of their immigration proceedings.240 As a result, parents may be involuntarily 
separated from their children. 
This situation is exacerbated when the immigration status of the parent 
and the child are not aligned, particularly in circumstances where the parent 
does not have valid immigration status but the child is a legal permanent 
resident or U.S. citizen. Cancellation of removaJ241 permits an immigration 
judge to grant lasting relief to a non-citizen parent if the parent has resided 
in the United States continuously for ten years, possesses good moral char­
acter, and can prove that his or her removal would result in "exceptional or 
extremely unusual hardship" to the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident 
child.242 In this situation, the parent usually argues that, in the event he or she 
was deported, the child would accompany the parent and this would result in 
exceptional or extremely unusual hardship to the child. Additionally, immi­
gration law generally presumes that a child and parent will be reunited in the 
parent's country of origin after deportation.243 Since a child in such a situa­
tion would not be required to leave because he or she has a right to remain in 
the U.S., a parent making these types of arguments inadvertently triggers the 
intervention of child welfare agencies, who recommend that the child be 
removed from the family because it is in the child's best interest to remain in 
the country, regardless of what the parent feels is best for the child.244 
In addition to arguing that U.S. citizen children should not be deported 
with their parents, but rather should remain in the care and custody of the 
State, these child welfare agencies also advocated for the termination of the 
parental rights of non-citizen parents residing in the U.S. simply because the 
parent does not have valid immigration status and therefore is an unfit par­
ent.245 For example, in Jn re M.M., a Georgia juvenile court terminated a 
2AO Id. 
241 Cancellation of removal is a form of discretionary immigration relief that allows an 
immigration judge: · 
"[to] cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien­
(A) 	 has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 
years immediately preceding the date of such application; 
(B) 	 has been a person of good moral character during such period; 
(C) 	 has not been convicted of an offence under section l I 82(a)(2), I 227(a)(2), or l 227(a)(3) 
of this title [except in a case described in section I 227(a)(7) of this title where the Attor­
ney General exercises discretion to grant a waiver]; and 
(D) 	 establishes that the removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to 
the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien law­
fully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (2012). 
242 Jd. 
243 See, e.g., Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 
F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981 ). 
244 See generally Yablon-Zug, supra note 237. 
245 See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 492-93 (Ga. Ct App. 2001). The juvenile coun 
deemed a father unfit to care for his infant daughter in part because he "[was] an illegal alien 
and [was] subject to deportation." Id. at 493. In a recent Missouri case, Encamaci6n Bail 
Romero, an undocumented from Guatemala and mother of Carlos, a six-month-old U.S. citi­
zen, was detained when immigration agents raided a poultry processing plant in Missouri. See 
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father's parental rights after finding him unfit because he was an undocu­
mented immigrant and where there was the "possibility that [he] could 
someday be deported."246 In this case, the father was not facing removal by 
OHS; rather, the mere possibility that deportation could occur was enough to 
terminate his parental rights. 247 These decisions are both a disturbing trend 
and run counter to past practices where "[o]nly a handful of courts have 
published opinions that formally endorse the consideration of immigration 
status in making custody determinations."248 
A parent's immigrant status should not be dispositive of that parent's 
ability to care for his or her own child. Additionally, it should not be a factor 
considered by child welfare experts in parental termination decisions. "Chi 1­
dren, as well as parents, have a fundamental, constitutionally protected inter­
est in the preservation of the parent-child relationship."249 Conversely, these 
cases illustrate how the State's best interest of the child standard is being 
misapplied by courts in parental termination proceedings because the court 
and child welfare agencies alike fail to understand that a parent's deporta­
tion, for immigrant families with mixed immigration status, may in fact 
cause serious harm to the child, as well as violate the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child's presumption that family unity is in the best interest of 
the child.250 Generally speaking, a child should not be removed from a parent 
even if the parent is not documented unless there evidence that the parent is 
unable or unwilling to care for the child. For a child who has valid immigra­
tion status in the United States and undocumented parents, the U.S. govern­
ment should consider whether or not the deportation of the parent with or 
without the child would be in the child's best interest. In such cases immigra­
tion adjudicators should consider exercising prosecutorial discretion and al­
low the parent to remain in the United States. Preservation of the familial 
unit, when appropriate, is paramount. 
C. Elizabeth Hall, Note, Where Are My Children ... And My Rights?: Parental Rights Termi­
nation as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 1459, 1460 (2011). The immigration 
officials refused to release Ms. Bail Romero even though she was the primary caretaker for an 
infant because they alleged she was guilty of fraud. Id. The fraud charge that was the basis for 
Encarnacion Bail Romero's incarceration was later found not to be a criminal offense by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Id. (citing Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (holding 
that identity theft, specifically using another person's social security card, can only be an ag­
gravated identify theft if the prosecution established intent; simply using another person's so­
cial security card is not sufficient evidence of intent to knowingly use another person's 
identity)). Ultimately, the state of Missouri terminated Ms. Bail Romero's parental rights and 
approved the adoption petition. S.M. v. E.M.B.R., 414 S.W.3d 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
246 In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 829, 831-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
247 Id. at 832. 
248 David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration law as Fed­
eral Family law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 454 (2008). 
249 Choiceless Choices, supra note 178, at 1179. 
250 See supra Part lV.B. 
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v. IMPLEMENTING A NEEDS-RIGHTS MODEL FOR CHILDREN 
IN IMMIGRATION LA w 
Despite an international mandate, as exemplified by the CRC, for a 
needs-based rights model to children's rights, U.S. immigration law has 
failed to incorporate these fundamental principles into its statutory frame­
work or its daily protocols and procedures. The following section recom­
mends a needs-based rights framework for children in immigration law that 
incorporates both the CRC' s framing principles and concomitant human 
rights obligations. Specifically, this section identifies discrete steps for the 
U.S. Congress to take in addressing significant structural gaps in the federal 
government's capacity to protect immigrant children's rights. 
A. Non-discrimination Principle Applied to the INA' s Definition of Child 
Consistent with the CRC's express principle of non-discrimination, the 
current Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) definition of "child" must be 
changed in order to accommodate both children who have parents and those 
who do not. Currently, under the INA a child is only legally considered a 
"child" if he or she is "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age" 
and fits within one of six categories, each of which requires a distinct rela­
tionship with a parent, including birth in wedlock, adoption, a statutorily 
defined stepchild relationship, and what is referred to as "legitimation."251 
Therefore, any child falling outside of these categories is, by default, an 
adult for all intents and purposes under the INA.252 
Treating two children, who are similarly situated (e.g., both fleeing vio­
lence), differently based on arbitrary categories is undoubtedly discrimina­
tory in nature.253 The child who fits within the INA definition finds safety, is 
afforded a path to relief as a derivative of the sponsor parent, and is given 
the opportunity of family unity; the child who does not fit within the INA 
definition finds none of these benefits and must "suffer the same harsh con­
251 Thronson, supra note 15, at 991. See 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(b)(l)(A)-(F) (2012). 
252 Thronson, supra note 15, at 997. 
253 The Supreme Court's decision in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
533 U.S. 53 (2001), underscores further disparate treatment created by current U.S. immigra­
tion law. In Nguyen, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of a man, who had lived the 
majority of his life in the United States being raised by his American father, because his father 
failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for unwed paternal transmission of citizenship. Id. 
at 70-71; see also Erin Chlopak, Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood: The 
Supreme Court's Preservation ofGender Discrimination in American Citizenship Law, 51 AM. 
U. L. REv. 967, 969 (2002). This result would have been completely different if Nguyen's 
mother, who was not a U.S. citizen and abandoned him in infancy, was a U.S. citizen because 
the statutory scheme of maternal transmission would have then made Nguyen an American 
citizen. Chlopak, supra note 253, at 969-70. Therefore, the statutory scheme led to a discrimi­
natory result in this situation as well, in that it treated similarly situated parents of American 
citizenship differently based on their gender. See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 
(1998) (discussing the same statute at controversy in Nguyen and holding that "[t]he biologi­
cal differences between single men and single women provide a relevant basis for differing 
rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands"). 
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sequences and limited procedural protections faced by adult immigrants." 
Unlike other areas of the law, U.S. immigration law still affords no legal 
distinction between children and adults when adjudicating potential forms of 
relief. Procedurally, there are no compulsory child-specific accommodations 
for immigrant children, as there are in family or juvenile court. Moreover, 
children are held to the same credibility and evidentiary burdens as adults. 
Moreover, such outcomes are wholly contradictory to Congress's appar­
ent priority of promoting family unity under the INA, which is evidenced by 
numerous amendments added since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 was enacted, such as "quota exempt permanent residence for children 
and parents of adult U.S. citizens" and "derivative status for the children of 
new permanent residents and nonimmigrant visa holders."254 Accordingly, 
Congress should also extend the definition of "immediate relative"255 out of 
the recognition that the family unit encompasses other integral members, 
such as siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, and cousins.256 Currently, 
immigration law provides no avenue for these members to act as the child's 
sponsor. If the child is not a "child" for purposes of the INA, he or she is an 
adult, and therefore simply cannot derive status from these members of their 
family. 
Instead of the INA specifying varying ages for various forms of immi­
gration relief and benefits, the INA's definition of child should be amended 
to read: "the term 'child' means a person under eighteen years of age." The 
age of majority, eighteen, mirrors the CRC's definition of a child.257 While in 
some circumstances this change will result in individuals no longer being 
classified as children pursuant LO the INA (i.e., unmarried, born-in-wedlock 
persons between the ages of 18 and 21 ), this new standard would be consis­
tent with international definitions of a child. Moreover, aligning the defini­
tion of child throughout the INA, regardless of whether the child was born in 
or out of wedlock, is adopted, is a step-child, or is married, fully realizes the 
CRC's guiding principle of non-discrimination. 
B. The CRC's Best Interest Standard Must Be Codified and 

Operationalized in Federal Immigration law 

Article 3.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) pro­
vides that, "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administration 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a pri­
mary consideration."258 The current immigration system does not-neither 
2s• Thronson, supra note 15, at 1009. 
255 8 U.S.C. § 155l(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining immediate relatives). 
256 Mzazki & Schoenholtz, supra note 154, at 654-55. 
257 See CRC, supra note 114, at art. I ("For purposes of the present Convention, a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier."). 
258 See id. at art. 3. 
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through statute nor regulation-incorporate the best interest principle, as re­
quired by the CRC, into the initial screening of children on arrival, the care 
and custody decisions thereafter, or the crucial decision of which avenues of 
relief to pursue. 
The child's need-rights model compels States to elevate the best inter­
ests of the child as a primary consideration, even when other policy goals, 
such as immigration control, are paramount.259 Several changes are required 
for immigration law to truly assess and protect the best interests of immi­
grant children. First, Congress should enact a federal best interest standard to 
be interpreted and applied consistently throughout the INA. Second, it 
should establish an interagency "Child Protection Corps" to ensure that chil­
dren have access to trained child welfare specialists and that the process for 
applying for immigration relief is a child-centered approach. 
1. Enacting a Federal Best Interest Standard 
In order to ensure consistent decision making by immigration courts 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals, which incorporates a child-sensitive 
approach to all adjudication decisions, Congress must first adopt a federal 
best interest standard.260 A federal best interest standard must embody a 
child-centered approach, which places the "best interests" considerations 
and the child's right to express views and opinions, referred to as the right to 
"voice," at the heart of the decision making concerning children.261 A fed­
eral best interest standard should also be a primary consideration in the treat­
ment of children in the immigration system.262 The Young Center at the 
University of Chicago Law School, a nationally recognized organization 
specializing in protecting immigrant children's rights and needs, has pro­
posed model legislation for a federal best interest standard. This standard 
incorporates the CRC's core principles. Accordingly, a federal best interest 
standard in immigration law: 
Shall consider, in the context of the child's age and maturity, the 
following factors: 
1. 	 The views of the child. 
2. 	 The safety and security considerations of the child. 
3. 	 The mental and physical health of the child. 
4. 	 The parent-child relationship and family unity, and the potential 
effect of separating the child from the child's parent or legal 
guardian, siblings, and other members of the child's extended 
biological family. 
5. 	 The child's sense of security, familiarity and attachments. 
259 Bhabha, supra note 142, at 281. 
260 FRYDMAN, supra note 212, at I I. 
261 Bhabha, supra note 142, at 281. 
262 Carr, supra note 44, at 149-53; Thronson, supra note 15, at 1014-16. 
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6. 	 The child's well-being, including the need of the child for edu­
cation and support related to child development. 
7. 	 The child's ethnic, religious, and cultural and linguistic 
background.263 
This best interest standard should not only be used to adjudicate immigration 
relief, but also should govern DHS's decisions pertaining to the screening 
and classification of minors, as well as the care and custody determinations 
of minors as detailed in the next subsection. 
2. Operationalizing a Federal Best Interest Standard264 
To ensure that the Federal Best Interest Standard is fully operationalized 
within the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Congress-through 
legislation-should establish an interagency known as the "Child Protection 
Corps," comprised of specialized experts: "child protection officers" who 
possess both extensive child welfare training and a deep understanding of 
immigration law. Child protection officers would be deployed to the federal 
agencies who are either responsible for the care and custody of unaccompa­
nied minors or are charged with determining whether these children have a 
legal right to remain in the United States. Child protection officers would 
ensure that government officials are applying the best interests of the child 
principle265 in determinations of care and custody, as well as providing long­
term protection and permanency. 
a. Custody Determinations and Placement 
In order to comply with Article 37(b) of the CRC, which dictates that 
the arrest and detention of children should only be used as a measure of last 
resort and should be for the shortest appropriate period of time, the U.S. 
needs child welfare experts to monitor and guide OHS and HHS regarding 
decisions about custody and placements.266 OHS is required to transfer cus­
263 Young Center Proposal for Best Interests of the Child Standard, YouNG CTR. FOR IM­
MIGRANT CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, http://theyoungcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 1/2013­
Y oung-Center-Proposal-for-Best-Interests-Standard.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B28X­
D8ED (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
264 This next section was pan of an earlier essay I authored entitled Getting Kids Out of 
Harm's Way: The United States' Obligation to Operationalize the Best Interest of the Child 
Principle for Unaccompanied Minors, 47 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE I, 5-9 (2014), http:// 
connecticutlawreview .org/files/2014/09/Corcoran.PUBLISH I .pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
YB5M-Q8TV. 
265 There is no singular definition of best interest, but there are some commonly accepted 
principles that should persist in assessing the best interest of unaccompanied children includ­
ing incorporating the child's voice, and prioritizing safety, permanency, and well-being of 
every individual child. See generally Carr, supra note 44. 
266 Linda Piwowarczyk, Our Responsibility to Unaccompanied and Separated Children in 
the United States: A Helping Hand, 15 B.U. Pue. INT. L.J. 263, 269-72 (2006) (documenting 
the severe mental health impacts on detained immigrant children awaiting adjudication deci­
sions, including: mood disorders, major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
dysthymia). 
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tody of an unaccompanied child to the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR) within 72 hours of apprehension.267 Presently, ORR is obligated by 
law to place unaccompanied minors in the least restrictive setting possible.268 
ORR typically detains these children in ORR-operated detention centers un­
til the child is either released to the care of a parent or close family member 
("sponsor"), or placed in HHS facilities that are licensed to house children 
when no sponsor is available.269 As to the latter scenario, such placements 
include long-term foster care, extended-care group homes, and residential 
treatment centers for children in need of certain psychological or psychiatric 
services.270 
The Child Protection Corps' officers would help ensure that, while the 
children are in ORR custody, the best interest principle guides all accommo­
dations, including policies regarding visitation, recreation, education, medi­
cal treatment, and nutrition. Moreover, the Child Protection Corps would 
coordinate with ORR and NGOs that have expertise in identifying linguisti­
cally and culturally appropriate community resources, including mental 
health and integration services. These NGOs could provide such services 
even at the inundated surge shelters and transit centers. 
b. Adjudication 
As Article I immigration judges adjudicate potential relief for children 
that are either unaccompanied or applying as the principle applicant, statu­
tory and regulatory safeguards must be in place to ensure that the best inter­
ests of the child are paramount. Congress should require that all 
unaccompanied children, or children who are the principal applicant for re­
lief, that are placed in removal proceedings be afforded a government­
funded or pro bono attorney who is trained in representing unaccompanied 
children. Under current law while any noncitizen facing removal may be 
represented by counsel in removal proceedings, there is no right to govern­
ment-funded counsel.271 In addition, the child would be assigned to a child 
2fi7 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2012). The Secretary of Health and Human Services has dele­
gated this responsibility to the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the Administration for 
Children and Families, a bureau of the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. § 279. 
268 See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (Supp. I 2013). 
269 See VERA INSTITUTE, supra note 219, at 17-21. 

270 Id. at 16. 

271 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). While the Supreme Court of the United States has not specifi­

cally addressed whether or not immigrants in removal proceedings have a right to govemment­
paid counsel, the federal circuit courts have recurrently rejected a constitutionally mandated 
right to appointed counsel for indigent immigrants facing removal from the United States. See, 
e.g., Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 24 
(1st Cir. 2001)) ("While aliens in deportation proceedings do not enjoy a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, they have due process rights in deportation proceedings."); United States v. 
Perez, 330 F.3d 97, IOI (2d Cir. 2003) ("As deportation proceedings are civil in nature, aliens 
in such proceedings are not protected by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); Uspango v. 
Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) ("Second, there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in deportation hearings, so any claim of ineffective assistance of 
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advocate272 (comparable to a state court best interests guardian ad !item) 
whose primary responsibility would be to assess, evaluate, and then advo­
cate for the best interests of the child. Working with both the child and the 
appointed child advocate, the appointed attorney would apply for immigra­
tion relief, including temporary humanitarian options.273 
In addition to Congress providing counsel for children faced with de­
portation, they should also require that all unaccompanied children, or chil­
dren as the principal applicant in removal proceedings, be assigned to a 
dedicated juvenile docket at the immigration court. Every jurisdiction would 
designate a day or a portion of day, depending on the numbers of cases in 
that jurisdiction, for all cases involving unaccompanied minors and cases in 
which the child is the primary applicant for relief. Every immigration court 
would maintain a dedicated juvenile docket with at least two dedicated im­
migration judges assigned to such docket. 274 These judges would receive sig­
counsel advanced by Uspango must be based on the Fifth Amendment's due process guar­
anty."); Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Deportation hearings are civil 
proceedings, and asylum-seekers, therefore, have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); 
Mojsilovic v. INS, 156 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1998); Sene v. INS, No. 95-3104, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 36140 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 1996) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 
1038 (1984)) ("Deportation proceedings are 'purely civil' in nature; thus, constitutional guar­
antees that apply only to criminal proceedings, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
do not attach."); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (I 0th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) 
("[N]o Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a deportation proceeding exists."); Castro­
O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 
(9th Cir. 1977) ("No right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is recognized in deportation 
proceedings."); United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987); Agui­
lera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975); Matute v. Dist. Dir., INS, 930 F. Supp. 
1336, 1341 (D. Neb. 1996) (citation omitted) ("Because deportation hearings are considered 
civil proceedings, aliens have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel; instead, the right to coun­
sel at a deportation hearing is governed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."). 
272 The role is already established and defined by federal statute. See William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(c)(6), 
122 Stat. 5044, 5079 (authorizing the appointment of Child Advocates for unaccompanied 
alien children). 
213 See, e.g., Wendy Shea, Almost There: Unaccompanied Alien Children, Immigration 
Reform, and a Mea11ingful Opportu11ity to Participate in the Immigration Process, 18 U.C. 
0Av1s J. Juv. L. & Po1,'y 148, 166-67 (2014) (advocating for unaccompanied children's need 
for counsel). Recent data from TRAC Immigration at Syracuse University concludes that 
among unaccompanied children represented by lawyers, in almost half of the cases the child 
was permitted by an immigration judge to remain in the country, about a quarter of the chil­
dren were issued a voluntary departure order in lieu of removal, and only 28% of the children 
represented were removed. Compare this to the 77% of children who appeared before an im­
migration judge with no attorney and were ordered removed, 13% who were issued a volun­
tary departure order, and only 10% who were permitted to remain. In addition, those children 
who are represented are rarely designated in absentia (failing to appear for a hearing before an 
immigration judge). For example, 95.4% of children represented by lawyers have not been 
designated in absentia. Similar rates exist even for children with U.S. family. 95. l % of chil­
dren represented by lawyers, and in a parent or guardian's custody, have not been designated in 
absentia. In closed cases, 93.5% of children represented by lawyers were not designated in 
absentia. New Data on Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION 
(July 15, 2014 ), http://trac.syr.edu/immigrationfreports/359/, archived at http://pcrma.cc/ 
FH7E-5HGH. 
274 Currently about one-third of the country's immigration courts have established juvenile 
dockets. See U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICJ; FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, UNACCOMPA­
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nificant, uniform training from child protection officers in the Child 
Protection Corps on adjudicating children's cases, including child-specific 
relief and how evidentiary rules should be applied to children in these pro­
ceedings. Finally, every Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Trial 
Attorney unit would have an ICE trial attorney who specializes in immigrant 
children's cases and has been thoroughly trained on the best interest princi­
ple from child protection officers. These ICE attorneys would be educated 
on when and how to question children in removal proceedings and be in­
structed to exercise prosecutorial discretion in favor of not seeking deporta­
tion in deserving cases. Lastly, these attorneys would be encouraged to work 
with appointed counsel to find a solution for the child that is in the child's 
best interest. 




It is unquestionable that the worst fate a child that has escaped a place 
of danger, depravity, and violence faces is being forced to return to that 
place by those from whom they sought safety. At the very least, the United 
States must create a form of withholding of removal for a child who would 
face irreparable harm upon return to his or her country of origin. For exam­
ple, Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture275 provides withholding or 
deferral of removal for an individual who is not eligible for refugee relief, 
but who nevertheless establishes that "it is more likely than not that he or 
she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal."276 In 
fact, "the CRC, unlike the Convention Against Torture, does not require 
State perpetration for an action to be torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, and thus the non-refoulement protection offered by the CRC is 
broader."277 For immigrant children fleeing irreparable harm from their 
home country, there is an affirmative obligation on States, including the 
United States, to provide protection by not returning that child to his or her 
home.278 This obligation can be met by amending the withholding of removal 
provision279 in the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a provision 
for children facing irreparable harm upon return. An amendment to the INA 
should include at the very least the following language: 
NIED ALIEN CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/eoir/press/08/UnaccompaniedAlienChildrenApr08.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/YH2A-NURK (providing agency overview of unaccompanied minor adjudications). 
275 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun­
ishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
276 Henry Mascia, A Reconsideration of Haitian Claims for Withholding of Removal 
Under the Convention Against Torture, 19 PACE IN"r'L L. REV. 287, 296 (2007). 
277 Farmer, supra note 144, at 41 (comparing CAT, supra note 275, at art. 3, with CRC, 
supra note 114, at art. 37). 
278 Id. at 47-48. 
279 8 u.s.c. § 1231 (b )(3) (2012). 
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Section 24l(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is amended 
by inserting the following after 24l(b)(3): 
(4) Restriction on removal to a country where a child would 
face irreparable harm 
IN GENERAL - Not withstanding paragraphs (I), (2), and (3), the 
Attorney General may not remove a child to a country if the Attor­
ney General decides that the child would face irreparable harm 
upon return to his or her home country by the government, indi­
viduals, or groups that the government is unable or unwilling to 
control. 
As a highly respected and central member of the international commu­
nity, the United States must establish a non-derogable, non-discretionary 
policy that creates a strict non-refoulement policy for these children. This 
policy would be consistent with what is quickly becoming a jus cogens 
norm-a norm from which no derogation is permitted-across the interna­
tional community of non-refoulement in the refugee context.280 Applying the 
emerging jus cogens non-refoulement norm to children fleeing harm would 
"enforce[ ] observance of the basic human rights that underlie refugee pro­
tection, because it fundamentally prevents [children] from being returned to 
situations where they would face violations of those rights."281 
In addition to establishing a statutory right to remain for a child that 
faces irreparable harm upon return, the process for assessing this claim must 
also be child-centered. Children who experience trauma often do not open 
up immediately. They often need time, in an appropriate setting, to express 
their true reasons for coming to the United States and should be interviewed 
by individuals with expertise and training in child welfare and development. 
Under the Child Protection Corps model, child protection officers would be 
imbedded at ICE to initially determine if the child is potentially in need of 
international protection, whether accompanied or unaccompanied. Child pro­
tection officers would make these determinations instead of Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) or ICE officers whose primary training and job respon­
sibilities are in law enforcement. These trained specialists would know how 
to interview the child in a comprehensive, sensitive manner that takes into 
account the child's age, maturity, and other pertinent developmental factors. 
This would provide a more accurate understanding of their eligibility for 
relief from deportation, including withholding of removal. 
28°Fanner, supra note 122, at 22. 
281 See id. at 22-24 (arguing that the drafters of the 195 I Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, who relied heavily on the guiding opinions of the States concerned, intended non­
refoulement to be a non-derogable norm and right). 
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D. Right to Participation: Expanding Immigration Options for Children 
Giving children a voice in immigration law requires that adjudicators 
evaluate both a child's opinions and needs when deciding if an immigration 
benefit should be conferred. For example, in decisions about whether or not 
to grant cancellation of removal, the immigration judge should fully develop 
the record to include the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident (LPR) 
child's perspective on his or her hardship if his or her noncitizen parent was 
deported.282 
In addition to integrating child-sensitive practices into the adjudication 
process, a child's ability to access relief under the INA must also be re­
formed. This means altering the family-sponsored immigration model to al­
low for children to self-petition for relief if they have a qualifying 
relationship with a U.S. citizen or LPR parent. Under current immigration 
law, a child must rely on his or her parent to petition, or agree to sponsor the 
child for a family-based petition.283 There is precedent for such a change. 
Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,284 spouses and chil­
dren of abusive U.S. citizens or LPR's can self-petition for immigration clas­
sification without the abuser's knowledge.285 The key is that the qualifying 
relationship exists; not whether or not the abuser is willing to petition for the 
non-citizen spouse or child. If this kind of self-petition were available, chil­
dren could apply for immigration classification in their own right. 
There are also examples of children being permitted to earn the right as 
children to stay in the United States. In July 2012, President Obama issued a 
directive, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which provides 
temporary protection from removal to a select group of immigrants who 
came to this country as children and have no current immigration status (the 
DREAMers286) but want to go to college or join the military.287 While this 
282 Thronson, supra note 15, at 996-97 (criticizing the Board of Immigration Appeals' 
decision in In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 20())), because the Board made 
generalizations about the hann the children would have experienced if they were deported to 
Mexico, without developing the record or focusing on the children's needs). 
283 Id. at 990-95. 
284 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. VAWA 
was passed as Title IV,§§ 40001-40703 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, and signed as P.L. 103-322 by President William Clinton on Septem­
ber 13, 1994. 
285 /d. §§ 40701-40703 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 204(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 216(c)(4), and 8 
U.S.C. § 244(a)). 
286 These individuals are referred to as "DREAMers" because they are the beneficiaries of 
comprehensive immigration relief legislation that has been introduced multiple times in Con­
gress entitled the "Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act" or the 
"DREAM Act." Since 2001, there have been at least 25 bills introduced that provide some 
path to legal residency for certain unauthorized immigrants who have completed qualified 
higher education, or military service, and have the requisite years of continuous presence in the 
United States. See Barron, supra note 197, at 632-37 (summarizing the failed attempts to enact 
various versions of the DREAM Act from 2001-2011). While each DREAM Act bill differs 
slightly, most versions contemplate enabling certain unauthorized, noncitizen students to ob­
tain legal permanent resident (LPR) status through a two-stage process. First, the individual 
obtains a conditional status by demonstrating that he or she has at least five years of residence 
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relief is currently only temporary, it "recognizes children as actors who, 
based on their own actions and ambitions, may qualify for immigration 
status."288 
Finally, in cases where a child is the primary applicant for relief, his or 
her parents and siblings should be able to derive status if it is in the best 
interests of the child. Under current immigration law, there are two circum­
stances where parents and siblings may derive immigration status from a 
child. In 2000, when Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Vio­
lence Protection Act,289 it created what is commonly known as the "U visa" 
and "T visa." Both the U and T visas include parents and siblings of the 
child among those eligible for derivative visas.290 This option should be 
available for any child, who is the principal applicant for immigration relief, 
including asylum. 
By expanding pathways for family unity and opportunities for children 
to petition for immigration relief as principal applicants, immigration law 
can uphold our nation's valuation of the family. Furthermore, such changes 
guarantee fuller participation for children, as rights holders, as envisioned by 
the CRC. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, debates about the nature and the parameters of children's rights 
have had little bearing on the existing legal framework for immigrant chil­
dren. Currently, no children's needs-based rights model in immigration law 
exists. Unlike other areas of the law, U.S. immigration law still affords no 
legal distinction between children and adults when adjudicating potential 
forms of relief. Procedurally, there are no compulsory child-specific accom­
modations for immigrant children as there are in family or juvenile court. 
Moreover, children are held to the same credibility and evidentiary burdens 
in the United States and a high school diploma, its equivalent, or admission into an institution 
of higher learning. Second, the individual, upon acquisition of a degree from an institution of 
higher education, completion of two years of a bachelor's degree or higher degree program, or 
two years of military service, can apply for legal permanent resident status. ANDORRA BRUNO, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33863, UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN STUDENTS: ISSUES AND "DREAM 
Acr" LEGISLATION 2 (2012). 
287 See Memo from Janet Napolitano, supra note 196. Relying on the Department of 
Homeland Security's existing prosecutorial authority, on June 15, 2012, the Secretary of 
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as adults. 291 Children have no right to government-funded counsel; instead 
they must pay for the costs of representation.292 Except in extremely narrow 
circumstances, they cannot petition to bring their parents and siblings as de­
rivatives. Overall, their child-specific needs and rights are disregarded and 
left unmet. 
This Article concludes that international human rights law-specifi­
cally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child-articulates a workable, 
comprehensive framework of children's positive (or welfare) and liberal 
rights, and can and should be implemented in U.S. immigration law. Specifi­
cally, immigration law must at a minimum prohibit the return of a child to a 
country where that child would face irreparable harm; permit children when 
appropriate to petition for immigration relief on their own behalf; provide 
experts trained in child welfare and immigration law to assess the best inter­
ests of the child; and provide free legal counsel to children facing deporta­
tion. Not only are these minimal steps critical to fulfill the United States' 
obligations under international human rights Iaw,293 but they are also neces­
sary to provide the space, tools, and means for an immigrant children needs­
based rights model to be realized. 
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